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My study examines 1264 business alliance announcements made by public companies in the Nordic 
stock market during 2000-2018 to evaluate whether such announcements generally produce 
abnormal stock market returns for the announcing firms. My study also assesses the types of 
business alliance announcements that produce the most significant abnormal effect on the stock 
price in the Nordics. The analysis is conducted with event study methodology including three 
different estimation models for increased statistical robustness. My results show that business 
alliances, both joint ventures and strategic alliances, generate a statistically significant cumulative 
average abnormal return of 1.40% during a three-day announcement period consisting of the day 
before the announcement, the announcement date, and the day after the announcement. The 
positive market reaction is most prominent in small cap firms as they produce a significant 5.74% 
cumulative average abnormal return during the three-day announcement period which is 
significantly higher than the 0.20% produced by large cap firms. However, I am generally unable to 
find other significant differences between the cumulative average abnormal returns between specific 
business alliance types although I find some evidence of business alliances with foreign partners 
outperforming alliances with domestic partners and high-technology business alliances 
underperforming compared to other alliances in the Nordic stock market. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tutkielmani tarkastelee 1264:ää Pohjoismaisen julkisen osakeyhtiön tekemää julkista tiedotetta 
yritysten välisestä yhteistyöstä tämän vuosituhannen aikana. Tarkoituksena on selvittää, 
tuottavatko kyseiset yhteistyön julkaisut markkinakorjattua ylimääräistä tuottoa niitä julkaiseville 
yrityksille. Tutkielmani myös pohtii, minkä tyyppiset yritysyhteistyömuodot aiheuttavat 
merkittävimpiä positiivisia osakemarkkinareaktioita Pohjoismaissa. Analyysini perustuu 
tapahtumatutkimukseen, joka sisältää kolme erilaista ennustemallia paremman tilastollisen 
merkittävyyden saavuttamiseksi. Tulokseni osoittavat, että yhteisyritykset ja strategiset liitot 
tuottavat keskimäärin 1.40% markkinakorjattua ylimääräistä tuottoa kolmen päivän 
julkaisuaikavälin sisällä. Ylimääräinen tuotto on huomattavin pienten yritysten keskuudessa, jotka 
tuottavat keskimäärin 5.74% markkinakorjattua ylimääräistä tuottoa kyseisellä aikavälillä. Tulos on 
huomattavasti korkeampi verrattuna suurten yritysten vastaavaan, joiden markkinakorjattu 
keskimääräinen ylimääräinen tuotto samalla ajanjaksolla on 0.20%. En kuitenkaan löydä muita 
tilastollisesti hyvin merkittäviä tekijöitä verratessa yritysten välisiä yhteistyöjulkaisuja niiden eri 
luonteenpiirteiden perusteella. Havaitsen kuitenkin, että yritysyhteistyön julkaiseminen 
ulkomaisten yhteistyökumppaneiden kanssa tuottaa jonkin verran enemmän markkinakorjattua 
ylimääräistä tuottoa kotimaisiin yhteistyökumppaneihin verrattuna ja että korkean teknologian 
yritysyhteistyön julkaiseminen tuottaa hieman vähemmän markkinakorjattua ylimääräistä tuottoa 
muihin julkaisuihin verrattuna Pohjoismaiden osakemarkkinoilla. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Business alliances such as joint ventures and strategic alliances have attracted attention from 
many fields of study and there exists significant theoretical diversity on why such forms of co-
operation are practiced. There exists a dilemma, especially in management literature, on what 
should be called an “alliance”, a “partnership”, or “co-operation”, and all these terms and many 
others, are often used interchangeably. In my paper, all alliances have been publicly announced, 
often directly in the stock exchange, therefore making them truly “business alliances”. To 
clarify the terminology in my paper, a strategic alliance is considered a formal or informal 
partnership where the parent firms do not form a new separate legal entity opposed to a joint 
venture where a new entity with more explicit obligations and commitments is established. Both 
strategic alliances and joint ventures are considered business alliances in my paper. Figure 1 
demonstrates the distinction graphically. 
 
Figure 1: The specification of two different types of business alliances 
The below figure illustrates the division of business alliances into joint ventures and strategic alliances in my study. 
There exists multiple definitions in literature on what should be considered an “alliance”, especially in 
management literature. In my paper, every public announcement of co-operation with a business intent is 
considered a business alliance. I will examine two types of business alliances, joint ventures and strategic alliances. 
When the business alliance involves the formation of a new legal entity, it is considered a joint venture. Otherwise, 
the business alliance is considered a strategic alliance. 
 
 
 
The prevalent view is that business alliances are an important vehicle for value creation and 
that they generally create economic value (Kale et al., 2002). Often, the value creation is 
attributed to synergies similarly to mergers and acquisitions (McConnell and Nantell, 1985), 
lower transaction costs (Hennart, 1988), and interfirm learning (Arino and De La Torre, 1998). 
Some other popular explanations as to why business alliances may be preferred over mergers 
and acquisitions include reduction of mispricing, better risk management, effective transfer of 
key technologies, less severe agency problems, and contractual efficiencies (Das et al., 1998). 
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1.1 Contribution 
My paper contributes to the existing literature by answering two key questions. First, I will 
examine whether business alliances are in general value creating in the Nordic stock market 
during the current millennium. Second, I will broadly examine what specific company specific 
and business alliance specific characteristics generate the most value for shareholders. For 
instance, characteristics related to firm size, internationality, industry relatedness, and 
technology will be evaluated. Event study analysis will be the core methodology behind the 
results. The abnormal returns derived by the event study methodology are robust with three 
different estimation models. Furthermore, the sample size is large with 1264 observations. The 
Nordic setting for my research is also unique. To my knowledge, no research relating to 
business alliances and their stock market performance has been conducted earlier in the 
Nordics. Finally, the findings are further tested for robustness with a multiple regression model 
which aims to specify the most important characteristics of a successful business alliance while 
controlling for multiple other variables. All results in my study are presented with clear graphs 
and tables for unambiguous and easy interpretation.  
 
The result-oriented contribution of my study can be summarized in three main findings. First, 
my results show that announcing business alliances generally produce positive cumulative 
abnormal returns in the Nordic stock market for the announcing firms and that there is no 
significant difference between the abnormal returns for firms announcing joint ventures and 
strategic alliances. The cumulative average abnormal return of 1.40% for all business alliances 
during the three-day announcement period is statistically very significant. Second, my findings 
imply a strong premium for small firms announcing business alliances. The three-day 
announcement period cumulative average abnormal return for small cap firms is 5.74% whereas 
it is only 0.20% for large cap firms. The small firm premium is also supported by the multiple 
regression analysis in my study. Third and finally, I generally do not find consistent statistical 
significance between the cumulative average abnormal returns of firms announcing different 
types of business alliances considering the entire 21-day event window beginning ten days 
before the announcement date and ending ten days after it. Firms announcing a business alliance 
with a foreign partner and firms announcing a business alliance in the high-technology industry 
are the exception. The former type tends to outperform other business alliances and the latter 
tends to underperform compared to other business alliances. However, the overall evidence is 
not definitive enough to draw very reliable conclusions on the matter. 
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2. Literature review 
 
The literature review section of my paper will discuss the theoretical background behind the 
motives and objectives of forming business alliances as well as their advantages and 
disadvantages. The section begins by taking a deeper look at joint ventures and ends with an 
overview of strategic alliances.  
 
2.1 Joint ventures 
Joint ventures are business agreements where two or more partners create a separate legal entity 
together to achieve certain business objectives (Harrigan, 1988). In a broader sense, joint 
ventures also represent special cases of capital investment projects where resources from two 
or more companies are combined to achieve the given objectives under the combined 
management from the parent companies (McConnell and Nantell, 1985). The original 
management teams for all the participating companies remain intact under a joint venture 
whereas usually one or more management teams are replaced under the more traditional 
mergers and acquisitions. Some of the main motives to form joint ventures include acquiring 
new technologies, utilizing economies of scale through an extension of product lines, and 
receiving valuable government contracts in a cost-effective manner (McConnell and Nantell, 
1985). They can also be used to coordinate the management of excess capacity in mature and 
concentrated industries. Harrigan (1988) discusses two basic strategic motives for joint 
ventures: first, they augment internal strengths by concentrating resources in areas where the 
firm has a leading position. Second, they improve the firm’s competitive position and help it to 
adjust accordingly as an industry or market evolves and changes through time. In fact, joint 
ventures have been widely used by corporations as a tool to improve entrepreneurial capabilities 
and long-term competitiveness as they are valuable interfirm linkages enhancing the innovative 
capabilities of corporations by promoting opportunities for shared learning, transfer of technical 
knowledge, legitimacy, and resource exchange (Park and Kim, 1997). Joint ventures, in 
combination with other co-operative arrangements, can be used to weaken competition, to 
stabilize profit levels, and to initiate structural changes in other industry traits (Harrigan, 1988). 
For instance, the role of joint ventures in reducing competition first caught the eye of industrial 
economists before business strategists. The main function of joint ventures was shown to be the 
minimization of competition in this early research (Hennart, 1988). 
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Reuer and Koza (2000) discuss that there are more than a dozen reasons why firms could engage 
in interorganizational collaboration through joint ventures. Some popular reasons include lower 
transaction costs, scale economies, adjusting to competition, easily obtainable synergies, and 
reduction of asymmetric information. The resource dependence theory suggests that firms form 
joint ventures to obtain resources they would otherwise lack. Hennart (1988) argues that 
whenever the assets needed by a firm are public goods, it is more expensive to replicate than to 
acquire them. However, if the assets are also firm-specific, an acquisition could result, for 
example, in an undesired labor force. This would mean more management costs and cultural 
problems leading into economical inefficiencies. If the acquiring firm expects it will experience 
significant problems in managing the target, it might prefer a joint venture over an acquisition.  
 
As mentioned earlier, two or more parent firms combine their resources and form a new legal 
entity to achieve certain business objectives when they form a joint venture. Hennart (1988) 
divides these objectives into four key parts. First, joint ventures take advantage of economies 
of scale. Second, they overcome possible entry barriers for new markets. Third, they pool 
complementary pieces of assets and knowledge. Fourth, they can also reduce xenophobic 
reactions when entering a foreign market. Hennart (1988) further sorts joint ventures into two 
types, scale joint ventures and link joint ventures. Scale joint ventures aim to enter a contiguous 
stage of production or distribution or aim to enter a new market. The position of the partners is 
similar in a scale joint venture. These positions include forward or backward vertical 
integration, horizontal expansion, and diversification. However, in link joint ventures the 
position of the partners is not similar as one partner may be diversifying and the other partner 
may be integrating vertically, for instance. An example of a link joint venture is a venture where 
one partner is generating the output and the other is responsible for the marketing and 
distribution of the products and services.  
 
Koh and Venkatraman (1991) examine joint ventures by dividing them into four types using 
two dimensions. The dimensions are the theoretical perspective and the focus on research. The 
theoretical dimension includes strategic behaviour and transaction costs. The research 
dimension includes motives for the formation of joint ventures and their impact on firm 
performance. The first type of study concerns strategic motives to form joint ventures. The 
motives include the desire to offer distinct products and services which relate to enhancement 
of market power and operating efficiency. The second type of study seeks to explain the 
effectiveness of joint venture strategies and is concerned with two key questions, the impact of 
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joint venture formation and the conditions under which joint ventures have the greatest impact. 
The third type of study is based on the transaction cost perspective and aims to explain joint 
venture formation with minimization of production and coordination costs by comparing joint 
ventures to other governance mechanisms such as vertical integration and long-term contracts. 
The fourth and final type of study is the effectiveness of governance mechanisms which seeks 
to measure the performance of firms adopting the previously mentioned best minimization of 
production and coordination costs. 
 
Koh and Venkatraman (1991) also discuss the value-creating or value-destroying mechanisms 
of joint ventures. These mechanisms include the potential benefits, potential costs, and 
rationales for joint venture formation. The extensive benefits of joint ventures are divided into 
four main categories. First, economies of scale are utilized when two or more partners combine 
their activities under one entity. Second, the partners have access to complementary assets. This 
includes the pooling of different kinds of assets in various business areas such as production, 
marketing, design, and manufacturing. Third, the parent firms can share costs and risks which 
is especially useful when investing in projects that require extensive research and development 
costs under uncertain demand combined with short product or technology life cycles. A joint 
venture participant may also effectively shape the scope of competition by pre-empting existing 
and potential competitors with a first-mover advantage. Fourth, the last value creating 
mechanism of joint venture formation is the key rationale behind it. Some popular rationales 
include gaining fast access to new technology and markets along with the economies of scale 
and risk sharing among the parent firms beyond the scope attainable by a single organization 
alone. 
 
Joint ventures also embed costs. Koh and Venkatraman (1991) discuss three categories of these 
potential costs. First, joint ventures include coordination costs between partners which might 
be significant if the interests between the partners are not aligned. Second, joint ventures may 
result in erosion of competitive advantage should too much firm-specific expertise be passed 
on to the other partner. Furthermore, the competitive advantage may diminish should the 
formation of joint ventures lower the barriers of entry for competitors. Third, forming a joint 
venture may create an adverse bargaining position for the other partner as it may have 
committed to irreversible investments. This enables the other partner to behave 
opportunistically in negotiations and capture a disproportionate share of the joint venture’s 
value.  
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Chung et al. (1993) focus on international joint ventures in their research. The rationale for joint 
ventures discussed by them is very similar to Koh and Venkatraman’s (1991) arguments. They 
mention that particularly the reduction of research and development costs in high technology 
industries could be key main driver behind joint venture activity in an international setting as 
many high-end technologies may be too high for a firm to pay alone. Furthermore, some 
companies might not have the necessary expertise to successfully execute the research process 
on their own. Other important drivers behind international joint ventures include market 
expansion, scale economies, reduction of risks through portfolio diversification, and the option 
for future co-operation, for instance, in the form of strategic alliances. Chung et al. (1993) also 
determine two key costs of forming international joint ventures. First, victimization may occur 
when the other partner takes advantage of the venture and leaves the other partner with 
diminished control over innovative technology, differentiated products, trademarks and brand 
names. Second, joint ventures may lead into managerial conflicts when decision making is 
divided among the partners. For instance, the partners may have different views on reinvestment 
policy, pricing, accounting policies, marketing strategies, investments on new products, and the 
promotion of managers. Furthermore, cultural differences, varying organizational structures, 
and incompatible key information technology systems may lead to further problems. There also 
exists a potential problem in forming a joint venture that arises from the employment 
relationship between managers assigned to the venture and their parent organizations. Joint 
venture managers often pursue personal goals that may be misaligned from the goals of the 
parent firms. This in turn aggravates the problem of effectively monitoring the behaviour of the 
venture managers since joint ventures are typically formed in relatively new and risky 
environments with high amounts of uncertainty. Managerial misbehaviour is thus harder to 
notice (Park and Kim, 1997). 
 
Overall, the managerial motives to establish joint ventures are very similar to mergers and 
acquisitions and the bulk of previous research has assumed that they have similar financial 
implications compared to mergers and acquisitions (Park and Kim, 1997). Since it is not 
possible to identify acquired and acquiring firms in joint ventures, it seems reasonable that the 
estimated average wealth increase for all firms involved in joint ventures should lie somewhere 
between those for acquired and acquiring companies in mergers and acquisitions (McConnell 
and Nantell, 1985). As is the case for mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures should therefore 
show comparable potential synergy gains from pooling resources since they represent similar 
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economic phenomena. Hennart and Reddy (1997) argue that joint ventures are attractive 
compared to mergers and acquisitions especially ex-post when firms would otherwise face 
substantial costs of integrating targeted assets. The post-acquisition integration problem is more 
likely when the target firm is relatively large and has a non-divisionalized organizational 
structure resulting in an “indigestibility” problem of acquired assets. The indigestibility theory 
assumes joint ventures are preferred when the desired assets of the target are embedded with 
undesired assets since an acquisition in this case would be problematic. The indigestibility 
problem can be avoided, at least to some extent, with joint ventures, as joint ventures only 
combine a subset of firms’ resources whereas mergers and acquisitions usually combine all the 
resources.  
 
Hennart and Reddy (1997) also discuss the potential ex-ante benefits of joint ventures compared 
to mergers and acquisitions. Joint ventures may be able to reduce the uncertainty and costs of 
valuing complementary assets before the transaction as the goals of the companies are likely 
more aligned when they decide to form a joint venture. This view of asymmetric information 
implies that companies prefer joint ventures over mergers and acquisitions if enough resource 
valuation problems exist due to a large disparity of information between the buyer and seller. 
The asymmetric information problem may also be emphasized due to the seller’s difficulty in 
signaling the true value of its assets. As suggested by Balakrishnan and Koza (1993), joint 
ventures also offer the possibility to “learn” the true value of the assets which further reduces 
the problem of asymmetric information. In conclusion, the decreased asymmetric information 
provided by joint ventures compared to mergers and acquisitions will likely result in overall 
lower transaction costs. Furthermore, Hennart and Reddy (1997) predict that joint ventures are 
preferable when the target and buyer belong to different industries since an acquisition of this 
type has increased asymmetric information and higher transaction costs. Cultural differences 
combined with governmental and institutional barriers also play a role. Joint ventures could be 
attractive especially when diversifying to new markets and products as they reduce the impact 
of adverse selection through asymmetric information since the objectives of the parties involved 
are more aligned compared to mergers and acquisitions. The disparity between the buyer and 
seller is less prominent. Furthermore, post integration challenges of joint ventures are less 
significant compared to acquisitions when neither firm ceases to exist. Thus, managing 
potential cultural differences and employee turnover may become easier. Reuer and Koza 
(2000) revisit Hennart and Reddy’s (1997) ex-post indigestibility theory and ex-ante increased 
transaction cost theory caused by asymmetric information. Whereas Hennart and Reddy (1997) 
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regard these two theories competing, Reuer and Koza (2000) regard them as complementary. 
They argue that firms must struggle with both problems at the same time when deciding to form 
a joint venture. Even if the indigestibility problem doesn’t exist, firms are at risk of overpaying 
in an acquisition. Furthermore, the acquired assets may be indivisible instead of indigestible 
due to different organizational cultures and routines which may shape the parties to prefer a 
joint venture instead of a merger or an acquisition. Moreover, the ex-ante transaction costs may 
be more significant if the desired assets are embedded and shared rather than isolated within a 
semi-autonomous division of the target company. 
 
Joint ventures among some other corporate investments can also be considered as a specific 
form of real options since they offer valuable opportunities to expand under conditions of 
uncertainty. Kogut (1991) discusses two main forms of joint venture real option strategies. The 
first strategy is waiting to invest where it pays to wait before committing more resources. The 
second real option strategy considers the right to expand in the future. Joint ventures provide 
valuable growth options because the parent firms can reduce potential downside losses to an 
initial, limited commitment, as well as position themselves to expand in the future given that 
circumstances turn out favorably (Tong et al., 2008). Therefore, joint ventures as real options 
are especially useful tools as a response to future market and technological developments in 
risky markets. Furthermore, they are an attractive mechanism as they offer the benefit of sharing 
risks and reducing overall investment costs. This is supported by the prevalence of 
organizational theories suggesting that firms engage in co-operative ventures as buffers against 
uncertainty (Kogut, 1991). The real option embedded in a joint venture can be exercised if one 
of the partners decides to finally acquire the joint venture or if the partners mutually decide to 
commit further capital into the project. Sometimes, the partners may even opt for an option 
arrangement already during the joint venture announcement. For instance, one partner may have 
a right to sell its stake in the venture at some point in the future. Timing of exercising the real 
option plays an important role and should ideally follow a product or a market signal indicating 
an increase in the joint venture’s valuation. However, the real option value is not equal for both 
partners. For example, differences in option valuation can arise if the potential spill-over effects 
of the venture's technology complement the product portfolio of one partner more than the other 
(Kogut, 1991). 
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2.2 Strategic alliances 
Strategic alliances are very similar to joint ventures regarding their business objectives and 
many aspects discussed earlier also apply to them. Strategic alliances are formed to share 
resources between two or more companies often in product design, production, marketing, or 
distribution. They take many forms which vary from simple agreements to even equity ties. 
Furthermore, strategic alliances involve mutual commitment from all the participating partners 
but have less impact on the partner firms' operations than joint ventures as they do not create a 
new legal entity, do not involve cross-partner equity investments, and do not pool resources 
indefinitely. The strategic alliances, like joint ventures, enable firms to obtain capabilities and 
synergies they would otherwise lack from the marketplace. For instance, a firm may contribute 
its expertise to the strategic alliance and simultaneously gain access to special resources or 
competencies which would otherwise be out of reach or significantly costly for it to obtain 
(Chan et al., 1997).  
 
Das et al. (1998) argue that strategic alliances are value creating because they reduce 
negotiation, coordination, and monitoring costs. Furthermore, their long-term strategic benefits 
potentially far outweigh their short-term cost-benefit considerations. One way for strategic 
alliances to create value is by stimulating demand by strategies such as cross-selling, sharing 
of brand names, advertising, distribution channels, and more effective sales forces and 
networks. The announcements of strategic alliances also provide investors with information 
about a firm’s future plans, thus resolving some potential uncertainties. Chan et al. (1997) 
mention that strategic alliances may also add value by creating an organizational mechanism 
that better aligns decision authority with decision knowledge. In the optimal case, each strategic 
alliance partner has a specific decision responsibility for one element of the overall business 
objective and reaps the rewards and penalties associated with its own individual performance. 
In a strategic alliance, all profits accrue directly to the partners and do not fall under the 
discretionary control of the management of a joint venture company or an integrated 
corporation. Since strategic alliances do not create a new organizational entity, they avoid the 
agency costs associated with management's reluctance to release resources under their control 
once there is no more need for them. Strategic alliances may also add value through operational 
flexibility as they can create new links or disband quickly in response to changing market 
environments. Often, strategic alliance partners sign new agreements that expand or strengthen 
their business relationship (Chan et al., 1997). The role of long relationships between firms 
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forming strategic alliances has also been studied. Anand and Khanna (2000) emphasize the 
effect of learning when forming alliances as they found that firms with greater previous alliance 
experience generate significantly higher stock market returns compared to firms without the 
prior experience. Kale et al. (2002) confirm this finding and discuss several reasons as to why 
the previous experience with a given partner could be beneficial. First, a company may have 
greater commitment to make the alliance work given the prior successful co-operation. Second, 
prior experience helps the firm to build partner-specific routines of coordinating resources and 
tasks. 
 
Strategic alliances also have disadvantages. One disadvantage is the opportunistic behavior of 
one or multiple partners resulting in uneven distribution of value between the partners. Chan et 
al. (1997) mention that one consequence of this opportunism is that firms incur costs in 
searching reliable partners, in designing contracts to reduce opportunistic behavior, and in 
monitoring the actions of other strategic alliance partners. As a result, partners will more likely 
pool their resources rather than share key specialized knowledge to maintain a competitive 
advantage. Furthermore, Das et al. (1998) argue that the decision to form a strategic alliance 
might also stem from poor corporate governance. When the control and ownership are 
separated, managers no longer bear the full consequences of their actions. Managers may 
therefore form strategic alliances to protect their own position by making the company more 
diversified at the cost of shareholders. It is likely that not all strategic alliances are entered with 
the best interest of stockholders in mind and that managers are extracting private benefits at 
least to some extent. The terms of the strategic alliance contracts are often formal and flexible 
which may lead to renegotiation and opportunistic behavior with the potential to destroy value. 
For instance, due to a perhaps non-binding contract, a partner may have the option to bail out 
from the strategic alliance leaving the other partner to pay all the costs of an unsuccessful 
business opportunity. Thus, the explorative first mover is at a potential disadvantage (Das et 
al., 1998). The other partner firm may also be much more dependent on the alliance and can 
capture higher returns should the alliance be successful and suffer from a bigger downside 
should the alliance fail. Given the potential disadvantages, Chan et al. (1997) argue that a key 
determinant for the success of a strategic alliance is the mutual trust between the partner firms 
and the prospect for continued co-operation between them beyond the scope of the current 
agreement.  
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3. Construction of hypotheses 
 
The next section will construct the hypotheses of my study by reviewing the findings of prior 
literature. The first goal of my study is to examine whether business alliances in the Nordic 
countries, more specifically joint ventures and strategic alliances, generate abnormal returns 
during the announcement period. Other hypotheses are concerned with the characteristics of a 
successful business alliance. These characteristics involve the size of the firm, the 
internationality of the partner and of the business alliance, the relatedness of the partners and 
of the business alliances, and the effect of high technology. 
 
3.1 General market reaction to all business alliance announcements 
Perhaps the first event study with stock return data regarding business alliances conducted by 
McConnell and Nantell (1985) suggests that domestic joint ventures in the U.S. are wealth-
creating intercorporate transactions for the shareholders of the participating companies. Their 
results suggest that the joint ventures generated two-day average abnormal returns of 0.73% in 
the sample years of 1972-1979 one day before the announcement date and on the announcement 
date [-1, 0]. The market model with a 120-day estimation period ending 61 days before the 
announcement date [-180, -61] was utilized to estimate the abnormal returns. The estimations 
were done using two-day returns. The results of McConnel and Nantell (1985) indicate that 
joint ventures generate strikingly similar abnormal returns compared with other types of 
corporate combinations which supports the synergy hypothesis of joint ventures. Evidence of 
this phenomenon is the fact that the dollar gains scaled by the amount of resources committed 
to the joint ventures lie in the range of premiums generated in intercorporate mergers and 
acquisitions. Furthermore, the smaller partner in a joint venture was shown to receive greater 
excess returns compared to the larger partner with the dollar gains being more equally divided. 
McConnell and Nantell (1985) recognize that it is possible that the announcements of joint 
ventures might sometimes reveal additional information about the announcing firms which 
might bias the abnormal effect allocated to the announcements. Therefore, they also tested their 
results with a “noncontaminated” sample which excluded other news and events from the 
companies and obtained nearly similar results implying that the abnormal returns from joint 
ventures are not driven by other firm-specific information released at the same time. However, 
their results could overestimate the effect of joint venture announcements as most of the 
uncertainty regarding negotiations has already been resolved by the announcement date. 
Furthermore, the authors also recognize that the companies in their sample were among the 
12 
 
 
 
largest U.S. corporations making it possible that the resources required, and the additional value 
created by their sample could be overstated compared to the average U.S. joint venture. 
 
In their study of stock market reaction to strategic investment decisions, Woolridge and Snow 
(1990) find a 0.80% cumulative average abnormal return for joint ventures one day before the 
announcement and on the announcement date [-1, 0] in the U.S. during 1972-1987. They used 
a market-adjusted event study methodology where the abnormal return of a security is simply 
the difference in return compared to the market benchmark return. Their results indicated a very 
clear and strong relationship between strategic investment decisions and stock market 
valuation. Furthermore, the findings implicated that sharing assets with another firm generated 
the greatest returns considering strategic investment decisions. For instance, joint ventures 
which shared assets or resources generated the largest cumulative excess returns of 1.40% on 
the day before the announcement and on the announcement date [-1, 0]. Research and 
development joint ventures generated a 0.40% and asset construction joint ventures generated 
a 0.52% cumulative average abnormal return during the same two-day timeframe. The findings 
of Woolridge and Snow (1990) also indicated that early mover and fast follower strategies 
resulted in greater abnormal returns compared to defender strategies and that long-term strategic 
investment projects such as joint ventures created substantial value for shareholders in 
comparison to short-term investments. Furthermore, their results provided evidence that the 
stock market seems to reward managers who make well-conceived, long-term strategic 
decisions. 
 
Lee and Wyatt (1990) examine international joint ventures of U.S. companies where the partner 
firms are foreign private enterprises. The authors report an approximate -0.52% negative 
cumulative average abnormal return during the three-day event window [-1, 1] around the 
announcement date [0].  Most of the negative abnormal returns occurred on the announcement 
date [0]. The length of the estimation window is not clearly specified in their study and they 
use an altered market model to account for cross-sectional dependence in the return estimations. 
Lee and Wyatt (1990) hypothesize that their negative return findings are likely due to bad 
corporate governance and managerial agency problems which result in overinvestment in 
expansion that simultaneously increases managerial control at the expense of shareholders. 
Interestingly, their findings suggest that U.S. firms that formed joint ventures in less developed 
countries generated the least negative abnormal returns. However, these results were not 
statistically significant.  
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Koh and Venkatraman (1991) report a two-day average abnormal return of 0.87% for joint 
ventures in the U.S. information technology sector one day before the announcement date and 
on the announcement date [-1, 0] during the sample years of 1972-1986. The market model 
with a 200-day estimation window ending 71 days before the announcement [-270, -71] was 
implemented in their research. The findings of Koh and Venkatraman (1991) suggest that joint 
ventures generally increase the market value of the parent firms and that they are superior 
compared to specific strategic alliances such as licensing, marketing, and supply agreements. 
Furthermore, their evidence suggests that firms forming joint ventures in identical industries 
generated superior abnormal returns compared to more unrelated industries and that smaller 
partners produced greater abnormal returns compared to larger partners. However, the 
differences were not tested for statistical significance. 
 
Chung et al. (1993) find a negative cumulative average abnormal return of -0.35% for 
international joint ventures announced by U.S. firms during the three-day announcement period 
[-1, 1] in the sample years of 1969-1989. The findings suggest that shareholders suffer negative 
wealth effects from joint venture announcements. The negative abnormal returns mostly occur 
the day after the announcement date [1]. Their research utilized the market model with a 91-
day event window [-60, 30]. The length of the estimation period is not clearly specified in the 
paper. Their results indicate that the negative abnormal returns begin as early as 47 days before 
the joint venture announcement suggesting that major leakages about the upcoming event are 
revealed significantly early. Furthermore, the cumulative average negative abnormal returns 
continue to decrease beyond the announcement date [0] indicating a lagged price adjustment 
which is contrary to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The sub-sample generating the largest 
negative abnormal returns consists of international joint ventures with a foreign partner. The 
findings also provide weak evidence that international joint ventures in less developed countries 
generate greater negative abnormal returns which contradicts the findings of Lee and Wyatt 
(1990) where joint ventures in less developed countries generated the least negative abnormal 
returns. According to Chung et al. (1993), the type of industry does not seem to play a 
significant role for the abnormal returns. They argue that their findings of negative overall 
abnormal returns are most likely due to changes in general rationale to form international joint 
ventures. Furthermore, they hypothesize that managerial hubris, being overly optimistic and 
signalling theory may play a part in the results. Shareholders may take the announcement of an 
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international joint venture as evidence that a firm needs to form a joint venture to improve its 
prior poor performance resulting in a negative market reaction. 
 
Chan et al. (1997) find positive abnormal returns of 0.64% for strategic alliances on the 
announcement date [0] and roughly 0.85% in the three-day announcement period [-1, 1] in the 
sample years of 1983-1992. They used the market model with an estimation period of 150 days 
[-170, -21]. Their evidence suggests that establishing strategic relationships creates significant 
value for the shareholders of the partnering firms. The findings also suggest that there is no 
leakage of information and that the full market reaction occurs on the announcement date. Chan 
et al. (1997) also compare the abnormal returns of the smaller and the larger partner and find 
that the smaller partners experience significantly greater abnormal returns from strategic 
alliances, but the dollar gains are approximately equal. Therefore, their findings are in line with 
McConnell and Nantell’s (1985) research on joint ventures. Moreover, the evidence of Chan et 
al. (1997) suggests that high-tech firms experience more significant abnormal returns compared 
to low-tech firms supporting their flexibility and experimentation argument.  
 
Park and Kim (1997) report positive cumulative average abnormal returns for joint ventures of 
U.S. firms around the event date, for instance 1.24% during the four-day event window [-2, 1] 
around the event date during 1979-1988. They used the market model with an approximately 
one-year estimation period [-264, -15]. Their study also provides proof that small firms gain 
significantly larger abnormal returns compared to large firms and that related partners generate 
greater abnormal returns compared to unrelated partners. Furthermore, joint ventures repeated 
between same partners are viewed more favourably by the market. A concluding remark is that 
the valuation effect of joint ventures is multifaceted and depends on the relationship between 
the partners, the nature of partners' contributions, the extent of partners' control over joint 
ventures, and the corporate governance in parent firms.  
 
The results of Das et al. (1998) imply a cumulative average abnormal return of 0.40% in the 
three-day announcement period [-1, 1] during 1987-1991 for strategic alliances. The 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns mostly occur during the announcement 
date and the day after it [0, 1]. They used the market model with a 200-day estimation period 
ending 10 days before the announcement. Their evidence suggests that technology strategic 
alliances are more value creating than marketing alliances which is in line with the findings of 
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Koh and Venkatraman (1991). Das et al. (1998) theorize that the difference can be attributed to 
technological alliances’ greater potential to generate more attractive future cash flows. 
 
Merchant and Schendel (2000) report a cumulative average abnormal return of 0.70% for 
international joint ventures formed by U.S. firms with international partners in the 
manufacturing industry on the announcement date and the day after it [0, 1] during 1986-1990. 
Their results also suggest that firms forming joint ventures in related industries experience 
significant abnormal returns, but the relatedness of the partner is not of statistical significance. 
Experience on previous joint ventures and cultural differences don’t play a significant role 
either and some evidence is found that forming joint ventures in low competition core business 
is not value creating. Moreover, Merchant and Schendel’s (2000) results imply that forming 
joint ventures in highly competitive core businesses doesn’t affect abnormal returns 
significantly. 
 
Reuer and Koza’s (2000) research on domestic and international joint ventures suggests a 
cumulative average abnormal return of 0.44% for joint ventures around the three-day 
announcement period [-1, 1] for their entire sample of 297 announcements. International joint 
ventures with unrelated industry partners, but with a related joint venture industry generated 
the largest cumulative average abnormal return of 0.62% and joint ventures with both related 
industry partners and related joint venture industries produced the most negative cumulative 
average abnormal return of -0.79 during the same event window [-1, 1]. Their results also imply 
that the stock market reacts positively to joint ventures formed under conditions of asymmetric 
information, that is, the more unrelated the partners are, the better abnormal returns for the 
venture. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the general findings of notable previous literature concerning business 
alliances. Given that almost all prior studies suggest a positive stock market reaction to the 
announcements of business alliances, my first hypothesis is constructed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The announcements of business alliances, more specifically joint ventures and 
strategic alliances, generate a positive cumulative average abnormal stock market return in the 
Nordic stock market.
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Table 1: Summary of the findings of abnormal returns by prior literature 
The below table illustrates the general findings and characteristics of notable previous literature concerning the cumulative average abnormal returns of business alliances. 
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3.2 Joint venture premium over strategic alliances 
Some previous literature implies that joint ventures should generate greater returns compared 
to strategic alliances. Joint ventures create a new legal entity as well as certain equity ties 
between the partner firms. As suggested by Stuart et al. (1999) these equity ties may signal 
greater commitment and confidence in the partnership. Combining partnership and ownership, 
as is the case in joint ventures, is also useful in managing contractual inefficiencies more 
effectively as it’s almost never possible to contractually specify all terms in a strategic alliance. 
Furthermore, when both partners have an equity stake in the partnership, they are more likely 
to refrain from opportunistic behaviour.  There exists little evidence for a possible joint venture 
premium over strategic alliances. Koh and Venkatraman’s (1991) results suggest that joint 
ventures are superior to certain types of strategic alliances such as licensing, marketing, and 
supply agreements. However, joint ventures were not proven to be superior to technology 
exchanges, which are certain types of strategic alliances. Allen and Phillips’ (2000) findings 
suggest that abnormal returns for strategic alliances are greater when an equity stake is 
involved. As joint ventures always contain an equity stake, the finding might hold for them as 
well. 
 
The evidence suggesting a joint venture premium is scarce and the two types are not often 
compared. Furthermore, looking back at Table 1 of previous research’s findings, there doesn’t 
seem to be significant differences between the general abnormal returns of joint ventures and 
strategic alliances. Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference between the cumulative average abnormal 
stock market returns of joint ventures and strategic alliances in the Nordic stock market. 
 
3.3 Small firm premium 
McConnell and Nantell’s (1985) results indicate that the smaller partner gains larger excess 
returns but the dollar gains are more equally distributed. Therefore, it can be argued that relative 
size in joint ventures serves as a proxy for the acquiring and acquired firms in mergers and 
acquisitions. In fact, sometimes business alliances evolve into mergers and acquisitions over 
time (Mody, 1993). Park and Kim (1997) also find support for the small firm premium and go 
as far as to say that partner size is a critical variable affecting wealth gains from joint ventures 
and that joint ventures have different strategic and managerial implications for different partners 
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depending on their size. Particularly the smaller partners in joint ventures are regarded as risky 
investments by the stock market as their expertise may be exploited by the larger partner. 
Moreover, the degree of control in the joint venture may be limited for the smaller partner. 
Therefore, having enough equity share in the joint venture is regarded as an important corporate 
governance mechanism when forming joint ventures.  
 
McConnell and Nantell (1985) tested the small firm premium hypothesis by isolating joint 
venture announcements. Their results report that the smaller firms generate an average two-day 
announcement period [-1, 0] excess return of 1.10% and larger firms generate a 0.63% excess 
return. Both results were statistically significant. However, the excess returns in dollar values 
were somewhat greater for the larger firms, roughly $6.65 million compared to the approximate 
$4.54 million of smaller firms. Koh and Venkatraman’s (1991) findings also imply that both 
smaller and larger firms generate positive two-day announcement period [-1, 0] returns, 1.13% 
for the smaller partner and 0.44% for the larger partner. However, only the smaller partner 
produced statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, the dollar value for the smaller 
partner was $19.2 million for the smaller firm compared to only $2.3 for the larger partner 
which is inconsistent with the relative size hypothesis suggested by McConnell and Nantell 
(1985). The findings of Park and Kim (1997) are also in line with the small firm premium as 
they report a significant 1.92% four-day cumulative abnormal return for smaller firms engaging 
in joint ventures around the announcement date [-2, 1]. Chan et al. (1997) repeated the 
procedure for strategic alliances and received results supporting the small firm premium. 
Smaller firms obtained a significant 2.22% average abnormal return on the announcement date 
compared to the larger firm’s average of 0.19% which was insignificant. The results are also 
supportive of McConnell and Nantell’s (1985) relative size hypothesis as the dollar gains for 
smaller partners were $8.9 million and for larger partners $8.1 million. 
 
The small firm premium is well documented in previous literature regarding business alliances. 
Therefore, my third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The announcements of business alliances generate greater cumulative average 
abnormal stock market returns for smaller firms compared to larger firms in the Nordic stock 
market. 
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3.4 International and domestic business alliances 
Both domestic and international joint ventures face various sources of uncertainty. The 
uncertainties are magnified in an international setting due to economic, social and cultural 
differences. Tong et al. (2008) examined international joint ventures and argued that their 
ownership structure, product-market focus, and geographic location are important drivers 
affecting the value of the embedded growth options, but only under certain circumstances. Their 
findings propose that especially minority stake international joint ventures and diversifying 
international joint ventures contribute to the growth option value. International joint ventures 
can be an attractive entry vehicle for foreign markets since they offer the opportunity to share 
risk and the possibility to rely upon local partners’ resources and knowledge. They also enable 
firms to access upside opportunities by expanding sequentially as new information on key 
sources of uncertainty becomes available (Tong et al., 2008). Furthermore, international joint 
ventures may be an excellent mechanism to diversify a firm’s portfolio of investments. In an 
ideal situation, a firm forming an international joint venture captures effective scale economies 
through expansion, obtains crucial local know-how, benefits from cheaper research and 
development costs of new technology, and reduces entry barriers to target markets through 
increased knowledge of political and economic risks (Lee and Wyatt, 1990). International 
business alliances may also be viewed as value destroying. As suggested by Jensen’s (1986) 
notion of agency costs of free cash flow, managers may opt to dispose any available extra cash 
to unproductive investments for private benefits and increased managerial control. This 
investing of free cash flows to diversify is also a common explanation for poor performance in 
the field of mergers and acquisitions. For instance, some of the worst performing acquisitions 
in the past have involved investing of free cash flows to diversify into unrelated industries 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). Another possible explanation for the poor performance related to 
international joint ventures arises from signalling theory, both Lee and Wyatt (1990) and Chung 
et al. (1993) mention that shareholders may interpret the announcement of an international joint 
venture as evidence that a company is forming it to improve its poor performance. Thus, the 
announcement may reveal new unfavourable information about the company. 
 
There exists mixed evidence on the abnormal returns of international business alliances. Reuer 
and Koza’s (2000) results imply that both domestic and international joint ventures generate 
positive cumulative average abnormal returns during the three days around the announcement 
date [-1, 1], the cumulative average abnormal return for domestic joint ventures is 0.66% and 
20 
 
 
 
for international joint ventures the cumulative average abnormal return amounts to 0.18%, 
indicating that domestic joint ventures generate overall better returns compared to their 
international counterparts. The internationality in Reuer and Koza’s (2000) study was measured 
with the location of the joint venture. The findings of Lee and Wyatt (1990) and Chung et al. 
(1993) suggest that joint ventures with an international partner generate negative abnormal 
returns. Lee and Wyatt (1990) report a negative cumulative average abnormal return of -0.52% 
and Chung et al. (1993) report a negative cumulative average abnormal return of -0.35% during 
the three-day announcement period [-1, 1]. Both papers suggested that managerial hubris and 
signalling are likely to be the key reasons behind the negative abnormal returns. 
 
The evidence provided by previous literature regarding domestic and international business 
alliances mostly suggests that alliances with domestic partners outperform alliances with 
international partners. However, there exists less evidence on the impact of the business 
alliance’s location. Furthermore, the degree of measuring internationality is multifaceted. Thus, 
my next hypotheses consider both the internationality of the partner and of the business alliance: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Announcements of business alliances with a domestic partner generate greater 
cumulative abnormal average stock market returns compared to announcements with an 
international partner in the Nordic stock market. 
Hypothesis 4b: There is no significant difference between announcing a business alliance 
located domestically compared to announcing one located internationally regarding cumulative 
average abnormal stock market returns in the Nordic stock market. 
 
3.5 Related and unrelated business alliances 
The potential benefits and costs of diversification have been well documented in previous 
literature. Several reasons as to why diversifying may be profitable include managerial 
economies of scale, increased debt capacity, efficient resource allocation through internal 
capital markets, internalization of market failures, and reduction of the adverse selection 
problem (Campa and Kedia, 2002). In corporate finance literature, there exists evidence both 
for and against the assumption that diversifying destroys value. The debate is focused around a 
“diversification discount” and its existence. For instance, Berger and Ofek’s (1995) and 
Comment and Jarrell’s (1995) findings imply that diversified firms trade at a discount whereas 
other studies including Campa and Kedia’s (2002) research suggest the diversification discount 
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is only the product of sample selection bias in the methodology (Villalonga, 2004). Theoretical 
framework specifically behind the positive abnormal returns of joint venture announcements 
includes suggestions that combining resources in a related manner creates more value than 
combining them in an unrelated manner. This view is generally named the “relatedness 
hypothesis”. The underlying idea of the relatedness hypothesis is that companies can exploit 
their core competencies when operating in a set of related businesses and as a result, related 
non-diversifying joint ventures may create more value than unrelated diversifying ones since 
opportunities for value creation are maximized when joint ventures are closely related to their 
parent firms in terms of product and market scope (Koh and Venkatraman, 1991). Regarding 
strategic alliances, Chan et al. (1997) argue that there are two reasons why related non-
diversifying strategic alliances may provide value. First, the strategic alliance can create value 
as a result of pooling complementary skills and technical linkages. Second, the strategic alliance 
can enhance the firm's market power in its own product market scope similarly to joint ventures.  
 
The evidence of Koh and Venkatraman (1991) in the IT sector suggests that firms forming joint 
ventures in identical industries generate the largest cumulative average abnormal returns of 
1.32% during the two-day announcement period [-1, 0]. The less related industries also generate 
positive average abnormal returns, but they are not statistically significant. The findings of 
Chan et al. (1997) imply that firms forming strategic alliances both in the same and different 
industries produce positive abnormal average returns on the announcement date [0]. The 
positive effect is the largest in high-tech alliances within the same industry which generated a 
3.54% average abnormal return on the announcement date [0]. The average abnormal return of 
1.45% for non-technical alliances in different industries was also found to be statistically 
significant. Merchant and Schendel’s (2000) findings imply that related international joint 
ventures generate statistically significant returns, but the relatedness of the business partner is 
not statistically important.  
 
There also exists some evidence that unrelated business alliances obtain better returns than 
related business alliances. These findings are often explained with the fact that firms may prefer 
business alliances when significant asymmetric information problems exist between the parent 
firms or between the firms’ industries and the target industry of the business alliance.  
Balakrishnan and Koza’s (1993) research on 64 U.S. domestic joint ventures suggested that 
value creation was the highest when the partners’ businesses were dissimilar which opposed 
their findings on mergers and acquisitions where similarity was beneficial. However, their 
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sample size is relatively small, and they use monthly stock return data which is subject to be 
biased due to extraneous events unrelated to the forming of joint ventures. Reuer and Koza’s 
(2000) findings suggest that international joint ventures created with an unrelated partner but 
within a related industry produced higher returns than other combinations, the cumulative 
average abnormal return for the combination was 0.62% during the three-day announcement 
period [-1, 1]. For domestic joint ventures, Reuer and Koza’s (2000) findings suggest positive 
cumulative abnormal returns for all other combinations of relatedness except for the one where 
both the partner and the joint venture were in the same industry. These fully related domestic 
joint ventures generated a negative -0.30% cumulative average abnormal return during the 
three-day announcement period [-1, 1]. The results of Reuer and Koza (2000) are only 
statistically significant for fully unrelated domestic joint ventures where both the partner and 
the joint venture are in an unrelated industry and for international joint ventures with an 
unrelated partner and a related joint venture. These forms of joint ventures generated three-day 
announcement period cumulative average abnormal returns of 0.65% and 0.62% respectively.  
 
In summary, previous literature mostly suggests that forming business alliances in related 
industries generate the largest abnormal returns with opposite evidence being statistically 
insignificant. However, the effect of the relatedness of the business alliance partner is quite 
unclear with mixed evidence. Therefore, I construct my next two hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: The relatedness of the partner’s industry does not significantly affect the 
cumulative average abnormal stock market returns of the firm announcing a business alliance 
in the Nordic stock market. 
Hypothesis 5b: Firms announcing a business alliance in a related industry generate greater 
cumulative average abnormal stock market returns compared to firms forming a business 
alliance in an unrelated industry in the Nordic stock market. 
 
3.6 High-technology business alliances 
In their research concerning strategic alliances, Das et al. (1998) argue that high technology 
industries are more likely to benefit from the alliances due to product complexity and high costs 
related to obtaining the needed technology if created individually. Firms entering technological 
strategic alliances usually have products in the early stages of their life cycles and stand to gain 
more potential growth compared to other strategic alliances such as marketing alliances which 
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are more common in mature industries. Strategic alliances may also be favorable in the high 
technology industry as the sector is difficult to correctly value, making traditional acquisitions 
subject to severe moral hazard problems due to information asymmetry. A technological 
alliance may also signal the market that the firm is entering a growth phase, evoking investor 
enthusiasm (Das et al., 1998). Chan et al. (1997), supported by Mody’s (1993) theories on 
alliances, hypothesize that high technology firms benefit the most from the flexibility of 
strategic alliances as they are able to experiment in rapidly changing business environments 
with significant risks of uncertainty and failure already in the development stage of new 
technologies. Therefore, they expect that high growth potential firms in high-tech industries 
should contribute more value to a strategic alliance compared to more mature firms in low-tech 
industries.  
 
The evidence of Chan et al. (1997) supports the high-tech premium as they find a significant 
average abnormal return of 1.12% for high-tech firms entering strategic alliances compared to 
the insignificant average of 0.10% for low-tech firms on the event day. The high-tech premium 
is the greatest when the partners belong to same three-digit SIC industry, amounting to 3.54% 
on average. Technical strategic alliances in diversifying industries also generate positive 
abnormal average returns of 0.27% but the effect is statistically insignificant. Koh and 
Venkatraman (1991) reported a 0.87% positive average two-day cumulative abnormal return 
for technology exchanges in the IT sector during the announcement day and one day prior to it. 
Their findings confirm that firms regard technology access as an important motive for co-
operation. However, they recognize that their sample size of 102 technology exchanges is small 
and the effect could be due to some outlier observations. The findings of Das et al. (1998) are 
also in line with Chan et al. (1997) and Koh and Venkatraman (1991) as they report that 
technological strategic alliances generate more value as they find a 1.20% cumulative average 
abnormal return for technological strategic alliances during a three-day announcement period 
[-1, 1] which is significantly higher than the negative -0.10% reported for marketing alliances.  
 
Previous literature strongly implies that high technology business alliances produce greater 
abnormal returns compared to other types of alliances. Thus, my last hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Firms announcing a business alliance in the high-technology industry generate 
greater cumulative average abnormal stock market returns compared to firms announcing a 
business alliance in a different industry in the Nordic stock market.  
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4. Data and sampling 
 
Data regarding joint venture and strategic alliance announcements is obtained from Securities 
Data Company (SDC) Platinum™ which provides details on financial transactions. More 
specifically, SDC Platinum’s sub-database of Joint Ventures and Alliances under Mergers & 
Acquisitions database is utilized for the research. The sample years are from 2000 to 2018. The 
data from SDC includes information on the type of the transaction as well as information on 
the respective partners’ industries among other variables. The announcements are filtered to 
only include two firms from which at least one must be a public firm from a Nordic country. In 
case both firms are public Nordic firms, the announcement is regarded as two announcements, 
one for each participant. Further utilization of the SDC transaction data for my research 
purposes is explained later in the methodology section. After obtaining a list of all companies 
included in the sample, their respective daily return index data is retrieved from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream (DS) along with the daily market benchmark return index data for the 
sample years 2000-2018. For Sweden and Denmark, price index data is used due to limited 
return index data availability. Only companies from which return data is obtainable one year 
prior to the business alliance announcement date are included in the sample. Data regarding 
market values of the companies and specific financial data such as book-to-market ratios are 
also obtained from Datastream. Table 2 illustrates the general composition of the sample used 
to derive the abnormal returns. The full sample consists of 1264 business alliance 
announcements of which 424 are joint ventures and 840 are strategic alliances. 
 
Table 2: Overview of the sample of business alliance announcements 
The below table illustrates the general overview of the sample of business alliance announcements to derive to 
abnormal returns. The specific countries and their market indices, as well as the division between joint ventures 
and strategic alliances is also demonstrated. 
 
 
To test the specific hypotheses constructed earlier, the data concerning business alliance 
announcements needs to be sorted into specific sub-samples accordingly. Testing Hypothesis 1 
Country Market Index DS Code Joint Ventures Strategic Alliances All Alliances
Denmark OMX Copenhagen  price index COSEASH (PI) 30 122 152
Finland OMX Helsinki  return index HEXINDX (RI) 167 264 431
Norway Oslo Exchange  return index OSLOASH (RI) 106 122 228
Sweden OMX Stockholm  price index SWSEALI (PI) 121 332 453
Total 424 840 1264
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doesn’t require sub-sampling as it is concerned with examining the general abnormal returns of 
business alliances. To test Hypothesis 2, the business alliances are divided into joint ventures 
and strategic alliances. This is straightforward as SDC Platinum has a flag to sort the business 
alliances. For Hypothesis 3, the announcing companies are divided into small, and large firms. 
This is implemented according to Nasdaq Nordic’s guidelines: “Companies with a market value 
exceeding EUR 1 billion are in the group of “Large Cap”, while companies with a market value 
smaller than EUR 150 million belong to “Small Cap”. Companies with a market value between 
EUR 150 million and EUR 1 billion belong to the “Mid Cap” segment.” Market value data for 
each company is acquired from Datastream. Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian krona market 
values are converted into euros with Datastream’s currency conversion. Hypothesis 4a requires 
sorting the business alliance announcements into international and domestic announcements by 
examining the partner. When the two firms associated in the respective announcement are from 
the same country, the announcement is considered domestic. In other cases, the announcement 
is considered international. The countries of the parent firms are provided in the SDC Platinum 
database. Hypothesis 4b is concerned with the location of the business alliance. The alliance is 
considered completely international if both the partners and the business alliance are located in 
different countries. Otherwise, it is considered at least partly domestic. 
 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b examine the relatedness of the partners and of the business alliance. I 
will follow the methodology of previous literature (Balakrishan and Koza, 1993; Chan et al., 
1997; Reuer and Koza, 2000) and sort the business alliances and their respective partners by 
their three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes which indicate specific industry 
groups. The SDC Platinum database provides the SIC codes for the parent firms and the 
business alliances. In case the parent firms or the business alliance have multiple SIC codes, 
the primary SIC code will be used. The partners will be considered related if their three-digit 
SIC codes match. The business alliance will be considered related if either or both the partners’ 
primary three-digit SIC codes match with the primary three-digit SIC code of the business 
alliance. Finally, to test Hypothesis 6, the sample needs to be filtered to extract high-technology 
business alliances. To achieve this, I will utilize Kile and Phillips’ (2009) guidelines of 
optimally benchmarking high-technology firms by their three-digit SIC codes. The 
benchmarking includes 11 unique three-digit SIC codes for high-technology industries. If a 
specific business alliance meets their benchmark list of unique three-digit SIC codes, it is 
considered a high-technology business alliance. Table 3 demonstrates the specific composition 
of the sample into different sub-samples.  
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Table 3: Sample composition into different sub-samples 
The below table presents the descriptive sub-sampling of business alliance announcements. The filters are size 
(Panel A), partner relatedness by country (Panel B), business alliance relatedness by country (Panel C), partner 
relatedness by industry (Panel D), business alliance relatedness by industry (Panel D), and technology (Panel F). 
 
 
As is presented in Table 3: Panel A, most of the business alliance announcements are from large 
cap firms, which makes sense as they have more resources, investment opportunities, and 
excess cash. However, still a noticeable amount of roughly 19% of the announcements are from 
small cap firms. It is possible that small growth firms may be willing to take more risks and 
27 
 
 
 
therefore pursuing joint ventures and strategic alliances becomes more attractive. Another 
possible reason is the fact that bigger players are often interested in the unique technology 
possessed by small firms and wish to utilize or even exploit it, leading to the formation of 
business alliances with a small partner. Panel B demonstrates the distribution of domestic and 
international business alliance announcements by the location of the partner. The majority of 
the announcements concern a joint venture or a strategic alliance that is to be formed with a 
partner from a different country and only roughly 12% of the business alliances are formed with 
a domestic partner. The finding is logical as Nordic countries are relatively small. Thus, Nordic 
firms are likely to seek business partners across their own borders. Panel C shows the 
composition by business alliance country. Roughly 47% of the business alliances are formed in 
a country that is international to both partners illustrating that business alliances are often 
preferred in risky settings as was pointed out in the literature review section. This is especially 
true for strategic alliances as roughly 57% are formed in a foreign country for both partners.  
 
Panel D describes the partner’s industry relatedness when forming business alliances. It can be 
observed that most business alliances, roughly 69% are formed with an unrelated partner 
measured by the primary three-digit SIC code. However, as Panel E suggests, the business 
alliances themselves are more often related to at least one of the parent firms. Still, roughly 
57% of the business alliances are formed in an industry unrelated to both parent firms measured 
by the primary three-digit SIC codes. The relative degree of unrelatedness and expansion to 
foreign markets could imply that firms prefer business alliances as a tool under uncertainty, as 
was suggested by existing literature discussed earlier in my study. Finally, Panel F shows that 
a relatively large amount of business alliances are of high technology in nature. This is 
especially true for strategic alliances of which nearly half are formed in a high-tech industry. 
For joint ventures, the proportion is only roughly 22%. Again, this observation supports the 
previous literature discussed earlier in the sense that business alliances with less obligations are 
preferred when exploring highly risky prospects such as new emerging technology. 
  
28 
 
 
 
5. Methodology 
 
In an informationally efficient market, stock price responses to corporate announcements 
represent the market's evaluation of corporate decisions. To isolate the effect of a single 
announcement, the stock return of the announcing company needs to be adjusted for the 
expected return on the stock. The difference between actual and the expected return is called 
the abnormal return (Woolridge and Snow, 1990). Thus, event study methodology is 
implemented for every business alliance announcement to obtain the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns. Event study methodology can be traced back all the way to the 1930s (MacKinlay, 
1997) and it was further popularized by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll at the end of the 1960s 
(Sorokina et al., 2013). The methodology in my study largely follows the guidelines of 
MacKinlay (1997) who provides comprehensive instructions for modern event studies. In order 
to implement an event study, three different key factors must first be considered: frequency 
over which returns are measured, the length of the estimation period, and the event window 
used to measure the abnormal returns. 
 
5.1 The estimation window and the event window(s) 
All return data in the event study analysis is daily return data which is used almost exclusively 
in modern event studies (Sorokina et al., 2013). For instance, using monthly data could cause 
extraneous events to outweigh the effect of business alliance announcements (Koh and 
Venkatraman, 1991). There is no uniform agreement on the length of the estimation period. The 
lengths usually vary between 100 and 500 days (Sorokina et al., 2013). My study implements 
a 250-day trading day estimation period recommended by MacKinlay (1997). This time period 
is roughly equal to one calendar year. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the 
estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11].  
As for the event window, no general widely used framework exists. Excluding special cases, 
the event window in modern studies is usually within one week of the event announcement 
(Sorokina et al., 2013). I have decided to implement a 21-day period [-10, 10] as the maximum 
time period for the event window to also capture effects outside the immediate proximity of the 
announcement date [0]. I will also include different sub-windows within event window to add 
robustness to my findings. For instance, as is recommended by MacKinlay (1997), the three-
day time period immediately around the announcement date [-1, 1] will be the main point of 
focus in my research. Previous literature has also often focused on the time period very close 
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to the event as is seen in Table 1 provided earlier while constructing the hypotheses. Figure 2 
illustrates the estimation and the maximum event window of 21-days graphically. 
 
Figure 2: The estimation window and the event window 
The below figure demonstrates the formation of the estimation and event window. L1 is the length of the estimation 
window (250 days), L2 is the length of the event window (21 days), T0 is the first day of the estimation period, T1 
is the first day of the event window, τ is the event date (announcement date), and T2 is the last day of the event 
window. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period begins on day -260 and ends on 
day –11 [-260, -11]. The event window begins on day -10 and ends on day 10 [-10, 10] 
 
 
5.2 Measuring the abnormal returns and their significance 
Three different methods are used to estimate the coefficients which are obtained from the 250-
day estimation period [-260, -11]. The first method to estimate the expected returns is the 
market model which can be traced back to Fama et al. (1969). According to Sorokina et al. 
(2013) the market model is the most utilized estimation method in modern event studies. 
 
Market model estimation regression: 
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + εi,t 
where ri,t is the return of firm i on day t, rm,t is the benchmark market return on day t, αi, and 
βi are firm specific parameters, and εi is the firm specific error term. 
 
Market model expected return: 
E[ri,t] = α̂i + β̂irm,t 
where E[ri,t] is the expected return of firm i on day t, α̂i is the estimated alpha of firm i, βî is 
the estimated beta of firm i, rm,t is the market benchmark return on day t. 
 
T0 = -260 T1 = -10 τ = 0 T2 = 10
L1 = T1 - T0 L2 = T2 - T1 + 1
(Estimation window) (Event window)
T0 T1 τ = 0 T2
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The second method implemented is the market-adjusted return model where the expected firm 
return is set to equal the market return. Therefore, no estimation regression is needed. 
 
Market-adjusted model expected return: 
E[ri,t] = rm,t 
where E[ri,t] is the expected return of firm i on day t and rm,t is the benchmark market return on 
day t. 
 
The third method used for estimation is the Dimson beta model which is a variation of the 
market model. It is used to correct the possible bias occurring from infrequent trading of small 
sized stocks and market direction bias (Dimson, 1979). The estimated beta coefficient in the 
Dimson beta model is the sum of lagged, current, and forward-looking beta estimates. 
 
Dimson beta model estimation regression: 
ri,t = αi + βi1rm,t−1 + βi2rm,t + βi3rm,t+1 + εi 
where ri,t is the return of firm i on day t, rm,t−1, rm,t, rm,t+1 are the daily benchmark market 
returns on days t-1, t, and t+1, αi, βi1, βi2, and βi3 are firm specific parameters, and εi is the 
firm specific error term. 
 
Dimson beta model expected return: 
E[ri,t] = α̂i + β̂irm,t where 
β̂i = β̂i1 + β̂i2 + β̂i3 
where E[ri,t] is the expected return of firm i on day t, rm,t is the benchmark market return on 
day t,  α̂i is the estimated alpha of firm i, β̂i is the estimated beta of firm i equal to the sum of 
the lagged, current, and forward-looking beta estimates, β̂i1, β̂i2, and β̂i3, respectively. 
 
The daily abnormal returns are calculated after the estimated daily returns are obtained by using 
the three different estimation models described previously. The daily abnormal return is the 
difference between the observed return and the expected return. 
 
Abnormal return: 
ARi,t = ri,t − E[ri,t] 
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where ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, ri,t is the actual return of firm i on day t, 
and E[ri,t] is the expected return of firm i on day t. 
 
The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of abnormal returns within the event window and 
the cumulative average abnormal return is their average. 
 
Cumulative abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return: 
CARi(τ1, τ2) = ∑ ARi,t
τ2
t=τ1
 
CAAR(τ1, τ2) =
1
N
∑ CARi(τ1, τ2)
τ2
t=τ1
  
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, CARi(τ1, τ2) is the cumulative abnormal 
return of firm i from day τ1 until day τ2, and CAAR(τ1, τ2) is the cumulative average abnormal 
return from a sample of N announcements from day τ1 until day τ2. 
 
The traditional t-statistic is derived by using the cross-sectional approach as discussed by 
MacKinlay (1997). The method is used to remove the reliance on past returns in estimating the 
standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal returns. The cross-sectional t-statistic will be a 
reliable measure as event-date clustering is very minimal in my sample.  
 
Test statistic for the cumulative average abnormal return: 
tCAAR = √𝑁
CAAR
σCAAR
 where 
 σCAAR = √
1
N−1
∑ (CARi(τ1, τ2) − CAAR(τ1, τ2))2
N
i=1  
 
where tCAAR is the test statistic for the cumulative average abnormal return and σCAAR is its 
standard error from a sample of N announcements. 
 
When comparing means of different samples, the Welch's t-test is utilized, and when comparing 
medians, Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test is used, either paired or unpaired depending on the 
objective of the analysis. The test statistics for statistical significance are always obtained with 
statistical software to avoid manual errors. The statistical tables in my research will show the 
respective p-values for effective and consistent interpretation of results.  
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5.3 Multiple regression model for the abnormal returns 
To further examine the implications of my hypotheses and to add statistical robustness to the 
findings, I will construct a multiple regression model to explain the abnormal returns. The 
multiple regression requires a dependent variable, control variables, and explanatory variables. 
Next, I will discuss the variables used in my analysis. 
 
Dependent variable: 
The dependent variable will be the cumulative abnormal return during the three-day 
announcement period [-1, 1] obtained by the previously described event-study methodology. 
Other event windows will also be examined for increased robustness.  
 
Control variables: 
Book-to-market ratio: The first control variable in the multiple regression analysis will be the 
book-to-market ratio of the associated firms. The use of the book-to-market ratio is motivated, 
for instance, by the findings of Fama and French (1991), who showed evidence that for 
individual stocks, the book-to-market ratio has an ability to explain cross-sectional variation in 
stock returns. Furthermore, various previous literature suggests that the book-to-market ratio 
can capture information about expected future returns due to its potential to proxy expected 
cash flows (Pontiff and Schall, 1998). The book-to-market ratio is obtained from Datastream. 
 
Performance and risk: This control variable will be the firm’s latest performance as previous 
literature, for instance Chung et al. (1993), has suggested that firms may form business alliances 
in response to subpar performance. The first control variable for performance will be the 
difference between the firm’s last year’s return compared to the market benchmark return. The 
second control variable for risk is the annualized volatility obtained from the daily returns of 
the estimation period. The return data is obtained from Datastream. 
 
Types of agreements (dummy variables): Next control variables are concerned with the type of 
agreement regarding the business alliance. I will control for three types of agreements: research 
and development agreements, manufacturing agreements, and marketing agreements. The 
dummy variables will take the value 1 if the specific type criterion is met, and 0 otherwise. The 
data regarding the agreement types is obtained from SDC Platinum. 
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Private partner (dummy variable): Public firms face more obligations in disclosing sensitive 
information compared to private firms. Therefore, investors have increased information when 
both partners are publicly traded companies and may be able to make more informed investment 
decisions. The dummy variable will take the value 1 if the partner is a private company, 0 
otherwise. Data regarding private partners is obtained from SDC platinum. 
 
Explanatory variables: 
The explanatory variables examine the implications of the hypotheses constructed earlier. 
 
Joint venture (dummy variable): The dummy variable will take the value 1 if the announced 
business alliance is a joint venture, and the value 0 if the business alliance is a strategic alliance. 
 
Market value(ln): The explanatory variable will be the natural logarithm of the market value of 
the announcing firm. The natural logarithm is used to reduce the potential skewness of the 
observations. 
 
International partner (dummy variable): The dummy variable will take the value 1 if the partner 
firm of the business alliance announcement is located in a different country, 0 otherwise. 
 
International business alliance (dummy variable): The dummy variable will take the value 1 if 
the business alliance is completely international by location, that is, both the partners and the 
business alliance are located in different countries, 0 otherwise. 
 
Related partner (dummy variable): The dummy variable will take the value 1 if the partners’ 
primary three-digit SIC codes match, 0 otherwise.   
 
Related business alliance: The dummy variable will take the value 1 if one or both of the 
partners’ primary three-digit SIC codes match with the primary three-digit SIC code of the 
business alliance, 0 otherwise. 
 
High-technology business alliance: The dummy variable will take the value 1 if the business 
alliance’s primary three-digit SIC code meets Kile and Philips’ (2009) three-digit SIC code 
optimized criteria for a high-technology industry, 0 otherwise.  
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6. Results 
 
The results section presents my findings on the cumulative average abnormal returns of 
business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000 to 2018 to test the 
hypotheses constructed earlier in the paper. To revise, my study uses the term business alliance 
to refer to both joint ventures and strategic alliances. When comparing two different samples, 
the average of the three estimation models is utilized. This is warranted as all estimation models 
give similar estimation results. The models utilized are the market model, the market-adjusted 
model, and the Dimson beta model. The Appendix provides further details on the abnormal 
returns of a specific sub-sample by presenting the exact results from all three estimation models.  
 
First, I begin by examining the general stock market effect of all business alliance 
announcements to test Hypothesis 1. Second, I will inspect whether joint venture 
announcements generate greater returns than strategic alliance announcements, as was 
suggested by Hypothesis 2. Third, I will examine the difference between the announcement 
effect of small and large firms to verify if a small firm premium exists as was implied by 
Hypothesis 3. Fourth, a closer look will be taken at domestic and international business alliance 
announcements to see if they produce a different effect. Hypothesis 4a suggested that business 
alliances with a domestic partner should generate greater abnormal returns and 5b suggested 
that the location of the business alliance itself is not significant considering the abnormal 
returns. Fifth, I will compare business alliance announcements made by partners in similar and 
different industries. More precisely, I will check whether the similarity of the industry of the 
partner and the announced business alliance have a significant effect on the abnormal returns. 
These analyses will explore the implications of Hypothesis 5a and 5b which implied that the 
relatedness of the partner should not matter for the abnormal returns and that related business 
alliances generate greater abnormal returns. Sixth, I will check if high-technology business 
alliance announcements generate greater abnormal returns compared to other alliances as 
implied by Hypothesis 6. 
 
Finally, after the comparisons of different sub-samples, I will present the results of my multiple 
regression model to see if the coefficients of the explanatory variables are in line with my 
findings in the sub-sample comparison analysis. The dependent variable in the multiple 
regression model will be the cumulative abnormal return during different event windows.  
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6.1 Business alliance announcements 
To test Hypothesis 1, the entire sample of business alliance announcements is examined. Figure 
3 demonstrates the findings graphically. Table 4 illustrates the exact results and their statistical 
significance by using the average of all three estimation models and Table 5 gives further details 
on each respective estimation model used to derive the abnormal returns. The event windows 
have been divided into pre-event, event, and post-event timelines to improve the interpretation 
of my findings. 
 
Figure 3: Stock market reaction to all business alliance announcements 
The below figure presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for all business alliance 
announcements. The sample includes 1264 business alliance announcements during 2000-2018 in the Nordic stock 
market. The event window illustrated is the 21-day period around the announcement date [-10, 10]. The estimation 
models used to derive the abnormal returns are the market model, the market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta 
model, respectively. The average of the estimation models is illustrated by the dotted line. 
 
 
Looking at the results in Figure 3, and Table 4, there seems to exist positive pre-event 
cumulative average abnormal returns. However, these returns are not generally statistically 
significant. Only the market-adjusted model provides statistically significant proof in the ten-
day period before the announcement in the event window [-10, 1]. In timeframes where the 
announcement date is included, statistically very significant cumulative average abnormal 
returns are always observed. For instance, the model average for the entire 21-day event 
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window [-10, 10] is 1.28% and for the three days surrounding the announcement [-1, 1] the 
positive model average effect amounts to 1.40%. Both numbers are statistically very significant. 
The medians also support the statistically significant average effect in timeframes including the 
announcement date [0]. During the post-event timeline, some statistically significant negative 
cumulative abnormal returns can be observed. The model average negative cumulative average 
abnormal return during the entire 10-day post event window [1, 10] is -0.19% and the median 
is -0.25%. The observed negative effect is most significant four and five days after the 
announcement date during the event window [4, 5] where the negative effect is measured to be 
-0.40% by the model average. The finding is supported by the median value of -0.19% which 
is also statistically very significant. 
 
My findings imply a generally favorable reaction by the Nordic stock market in response to 
business alliance announcements. The results are also in line with previous literature strongly 
supporting Hypothesis 1 of positive cumulative average abnormal returns for business alliances. 
However, in contrast to previous research as demonstrated in Table 1 earlier in my paper, the 
cumulative average abnormal returns in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018 seem to be 
somewhat higher in the immediate proximity of the announcement date, exceeding the 1% 
threshold not often observed earlier. Furthermore, the lagged price adjustment observed after 
the announcement is in line with the evidence of Chung et al. (1993) but contradicts the findings 
of Chan et al. (1997) whose results implied an immediate market response to the announcement. 
My results from the Nordic setting suggest that there may exist systematic overreactions to the 
announcements of business alliances at least to some extent, and that the markets tend to 
“correct” themselves a couple of days later. My results therefore imply a violation to the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis. A few possible explanations for this seemingly systematic 
phenomenon include investor overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1998), noise trader bias (Barber et 
al., 2009), and lack of effective arbitrage trading (Mitchell et al., 2002). There also seems to 
exist leakage of information before the business alliance announcements since there is an 
upward trend in cumulative average abnormal returns before the announcement. These pre-
event and post-event trends, which seem to violate the Efficient Market Hypothesis, are easily 
observed in Figure 3 and are supported by all three estimation models in Table 5.  
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Table 4: Model average stock market reaction to all business alliance announcements 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of all business alliance announcements 
provided by the average of all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are the market 
model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day 
zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The 
sample consists of 1264 business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
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Table 5: Model specific stock market reaction to all business alliance announcements 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of all business alliance announcements provided by all the three estimation models for different 
event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the 
estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 1264 business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock 
market during 2000-2018. 
N = 1264 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.13% (0.434) 0.09% (0.618) 0.27% (0.111) 0.08% (0.175) 0.16% (0.333) 0.08% (0.430)
[-10, -1] 0.34% (0.140) 0.01% (0.678) 0.48% (0.043) ** 0.17% (0.322) 0.34% (0.138) 0.06% (0.502)
[-5, -1] 0.18% (0.351) -0.27% (0.113) 0.22% (0.261) -0.25% (0.219) 0.17% (0.377) -0.21% (0.130)
[-3, -1] 0.18% (0.272) -0.14% (0.361) 0.11% (0.529) -0.16% (0.177) 0.15% (0.348) -0.10% (0.349)
[-1] 0.11% (0.223) -0.05% (0.260) 0.08% (0.432) -0.03% (0.365) 0.11% (0.231) -0.04% (0.247)
[-10, 10] 1.13% (0.003) *** 0.11% (0.340) 1.56% (0.000) *** 0.69% (0.004) *** 1.16% (0.002) *** 0.00% (0.261)
[-5, 5] 1.06% (0.000) *** 0.00% (0.158) 1.28% (0.000) *** 0.37% (0.004) *** 1.06% (0.000) *** -0.02% (0.137)
[-3, 3] 1.49% (0.000) *** 0.19% (0.001) *** 1.52% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.000) *** 1.48% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.000) ***
[-1, 0] 1.20% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) *** 1.16% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 1.20% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.40% (0.000) *** 0.25% (0.000) *** 1.40% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) *** 1.40% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) ***
[0] 1.09% (0.000) *** 0.14% (0.000) *** 1.08% (0.000) *** 0.21% (0.000) *** 1.09% (0.000) *** 0.15% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.28% (0.000) *** 0.14% (0.000) *** 1.33% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 1.29% (0.000) *** 0.18% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.20% (0.054) * -0.06% (0.655) 0.24% (0.020) ** -0.02% (0.666) 0.21% (0.046) ** -0.05% (0.736)
[1, 3] 0.23% (0.113) -0.12% (0.420) 0.33% (0.026) ** -0.03% (0.404) 0.23% (0.103) -0.07% (0.639)
[1, 5] -0.21% (0.190) -0.34% (0.002) *** -0.02% (0.914) -0.13% (0.183) -0.20% (0.218) -0.29% (0.004) ***
[1, 10] -0.29% (0.178) -0.44% (0.002) *** -0.01% (0.979) -0.06% (0.541) -0.27% (0.211) -0.47% (0.005) ***
[4, 5] -0.44% (0.000) *** -0.22% (0.000) *** -0.35% (0.002) *** -0.12% (0.039) ** -0.43% (0.000) *** -0.21% (0.000) ***
[5, 10] -0.33% (0.062) * -0.25% (0.001) *** -0.20% (0.271) -0.11% (0.190) -0.31% (0.080) * -0.31% (0.002) ***
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
Dimson beta model CAAR
Event 
window Mean p
a
Median p
b
Mean p
a
p
b
Mean p
a
p
b
Market model CAAR Market-adjusted model CAAR
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6.2 Announcements of joint ventures and strategic alliances 
Next, I will examine whether joint ventures generate greater abnormal returns compared to 
strategic alliances in the Nordic stock market. As discussed in the hypothesis construction, joint 
ventures include more mutual commitment and contractual bindings with certain equity ties 
between the partner firms which in turn could lead investors to view them more favourably 
compared to strategic alliances as suggested by Hypothesis 2. Figure 4 and Table 6, 
respectively, demonstrate the comparison between the cumulative abnormal returns of joint 
ventures and strategic alliances. The average of the three estimation models is used for the 
comparison as all the estimation models yield similar results. The exact results obtained by all 
three estimation results are provided in the Appendix: Table 15 for joint ventures, and Table 16 
for strategic alliances. 
 
Figure 4: Firms announcing joint ventures and strategic alliances 
The below figure presents the comparison of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between firms 
announcing joint ventures (JV) and strategic alliances (SA). The sample includes 424 joint venture announcements 
and 840 strategic alliance announcements during 2000-2018 in the Nordic stock market. The event window 
illustrated is the 21-day period around the announcement date [-10, 10]. The estimation models used to derive the 
abnormal returns are the market model, the market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. The 
averages of the estimation models for each sub-sample and the difference between the sub-samples’ model 
averages is demonstrated. 
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The results provided by the three estimation models imply that both joint ventures and strategic 
alliances experience roughly similar trends in the accumulation of cumulative average abnormal 
returns during the entire 21-day event window [-10, 10]. Moreover, both types of business 
alliances produce roughly equal abnormal returns in the immediate proximity to the 
announcement date. The main differences illustrated by Figure 4 and Table 6 occur in the pre-
event and post-event timelines. There seems to be more information leakage associated with 
joint ventures five to ten days before the announcement [-10, -5]. However, the difference is 
only significant by observing the median value as is shown in Table 6. Another peculiar 
observation is that strategic alliances experience a more significant stock market “correction” 
in the post-event timeframe where they generate negative cumulative abnormal returns 
especially four and five days after the announcement date as is illustrated in Figure 4 and Table 
6. During this timeframe, strategic alliances produce a negative -0.48% cumulative average 
abnormal return which is statistically very significant. However, the difference compared to 
joint ventures’ negative cumulative average abnormal return is not statistically significant. 
Considering the entirety of my findings, I do not find enough evidence to support Hypothesis 2 
which suggested that joint ventures generate greater abnormal returns than strategic alliances. 
In fact, the cumulative average abnormal returns of the two types of business alliance co-
operation seem to be very similar, especially considering the entirety of the 21-day event 
window and the immediate proximity of the announcement date.
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Table 6: Firms announcing joint ventures and strategic alliances 
The below table presents the comparison between the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing joint ventures and strategic alliances. The comparison 
utilizes the average of the three estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, 
respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sub-samples 
consist of 424 joint venture announcements and 840 strategic alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
Median Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.38% (0.196) 0.35% (0.016) ** 0.09% (0.658) -0.06% (0.691) 0.30% (0.402) 0.41% (0.029) **
[-10, -1] 0.48% (0.281) 0.50% (0.151) 0.34% (0.194) 0.09% (0.904) 0.13% (0.798) 0.41% (0.201)
[-5, -1] 0.12% (0.709) -0.22% (0.345) 0.22% (0.340) -0.28% (0.221) -0.10% (0.812) 0.06% (0.973)
[-3, -1] 0.11% (0.723) -0.15% (0.540) 0.17% (0.391) -0.15% (0.300) -0.06% (0.868) 0.00% (0.810)
[-1] 0.13% (0.289) 0.02% (0.409) 0.09% (0.495) -0.12% (0.064) * 0.04% (0.815) 0.13% (0.063) *
[-10, 10] 1.39% (0.037) ** 0.63% (0.121) 1.23% (0.006) *** 0.06% (0.322) 0.16% (0.842) 0.57% (0.507)
[-5, 5] 1.30% (0.013) ** 0.37% (0.095) * 1.05% (0.004) *** 0.05% (0.232) 0.25% (0.697) 0.32% (0.540)
[-3, 3] 1.53% (0.002) *** 0.63% (0.005) *** 1.48% (0.000) *** 0.06% (0.011) ** 0.06% (0.926) 0.57% (0.437)
[-1, 0] 1.20% (0.000) *** 0.40% (0.000) *** 1.18% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.000) *** 0.02% (0.956) 0.23% (0.247)
[-1, 1] 1.40% (0.001) *** 0.34% (0.000) *** 1.40% (0.000) *** 0.15% (0.001) *** 0.00% (0.995) 0.19% (0.311)
[0] 1.07% (0.001) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 1.09% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.000) *** -0.02% (0.961) 0.09% (0.717)
[0, 1] 1.27% (0.002) *** 0.15% (0.005) *** 1.32% (0.000) *** 0.17% (0.000) *** -0.04% (0.925) -0.02% (0.843)
[1] 0.20% (0.292) -0.01% (0.954) 0.22% (0.065) * -0.03% (0.975) -0.03% (0.909) 0.02% (0.985)
[1, 3] 0.35% (0.143) 0.09% (0.473) 0.22% (0.220) -0.09% (0.488) 0.13% (0.654) 0.18% (0.316)
[1, 5] 0.10% (0.693) 0.13% (0.808) -0.26% (0.192) -0.40% (0.006) *** 0.36% (0.263) 0.53% (0.145)
[1, 10] -0.16% (0.650) 0.05% (0.497) -0.21% (0.449) -0.39% (0.038) ** 0.05% (0.918) 0.44% (0.476)
[4, 5] -0.25% (0.148) -0.16% (0.185) -0.48% (0.001) *** -0.20% (0.005) *** 0.23% (0.310) 0.03% (0.498)
[5, 10] -0.34% (0.255) -0.03% (0.185) -0.25% (0.250) -0.20% (0.043) ** -0.08% (0.823) 0.18% (0.880)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
c
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is zero using the Welch’s t-test.
d
 The statistical significance for the median difference is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for two unpaired samples using the normal  
   distribution approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the medians is zero.
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6.3 Business alliance announcements by small cap and large cap firms 
Previous literature has provided extensive evidence that smaller firms generate greater 
abnormal returns compared to larger firms as was discussed in the hypothesis construction 
section of my paper. However, the distribution of the monetary gains has been more unclear. 
To test Hypothesis 3 of a small firm premium, the sample is divided into small cap and large 
cap firms. Figure 5 and Table 7, respectively, demonstrate the comparison between the 
cumulative average abnormal returns of small and large cap companies announcing business 
alliances. Again, the average of the three estimation models is utilized. Table 17 and Table 18 
in the Appendix provide further details on each respective model used to derive the abnormal 
returns. 
 
Figure 5: Small cap and large cap firms announcing a business alliance 
The below figure presents the comparison of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between small cap 
and large cap firms announcing a business alliance. The sub-samples include 241 announcements made by small 
cap firms and 791 announcements made by large cap firms during 2000-2018 in the Nordic stock market. The 
event window illustrated is the 21-day period around the announcement date [-10, 10]. The estimation models used 
to derive the abnormal returns are the market model, the market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, 
respectively. The averages of the estimation models for each sub-sample and the difference between the sub-
samples’ model averages is demonstrated. 
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Given the results shown in Figure 5 and Table 7, it is obvious that small firms generate excess 
abnormal returns compared to large firms. The effect is most prominent in the proximity of the 
announcement date. For instance, the mean difference between the average cumulative 
abnormal returns during the three-day announcement window [-1, 1] is 5.54% and for the entire 
event window [-10, 10] the difference is 6.07%. The results are statistically very significant. 
Moreover, the median values support the small firm premium effect as they also are all 
statistically very significant in every timeframe including the announcement date. Another 
interesting observation in the analysis is the fact that smaller firms seem to experience larger 
returns in anticipation of the announcement and a bigger adjustment to stock price post-event. 
For instance, in the 10-day period before the announcement [-10, -1], small firms generate a 
cumulative average abnormal return of 1.88% which is statistically significant. However, the 
median value during this timeframe is not statistically significant. The pre-event positive 
cumulative average abnormal returns thus seem to be driven by a relatively small number of 
firms experiencing considerable pre-announcement hype. The adjustment to the abnormal 
returns is also greater in the small cap sub-sample compared to large cap firms. Small cap firms 
experience a significant negative cumulative average abnormal return especially during the 
post-event timeframe of four to five days after the business alliance announcement [4, 5]. The 
negative effect during this specific event window is -1.30% which is significantly lower than 
the negative effect of -0.15% for large cap firms. Furthermore, the median values seem to imply 
that smaller firms continue to experience radical losses even after five to ten days after then 
announcement. For instance, the median negative cumulative average abnormal return five to 
ten days after the announcement [5, 10] is -1.30% for small cap firms. 
 
Since the observed small firm premium in my results is so prevalent, I will examine the 
difference between mid-cap and large cap firms for increased robustness. Figure 6 and Table 8 
demonstrate the comparison between the cumulative abnormal returns of mid- and large cap 
companies announcing business alliances. The average of the three estimation models is again 
utilized. Table 19 in the Appendix illustrates the exact results obtained by each respective model 
in order to derive the abnormal returns for the mid cap firms. The difference between mid-cap 
and large cap firms’ cumulative average abnormal return in the three days around the 
announcement date [-1, 1] is 0.78% and statistically significant. For the entire event window 
[10, -10] the mean difference is 1.31%, which is also statistically significant. The median values 
also provide support for a significant difference in the proximity of the announcement date. 
Overall, the proof provided by examining both small cap and mid-cap firms compared to large 
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cap firms is supportive of the small firm premium as suggested by Hypothesis 3. The results 
also have some interesting implications. They are in line with previous literature, but the 
measured effect seems to be much higher. The differences may be explained by the 
methodology in sampling. Some studies look at the relative size of the partners, where a firm 
in considered small if it is the smaller of the two partner firms. This may lead some of the firms 
in the sample to be considered small even if they are relatively large by their market 
capitalization. Furthermore, my study takes the approach of considering a given firm small if 
its market value is below a threshold of 150 million euros, which may steer the results upward 
compared to prior studies with no fixed criteria. 
 
Figure 6: Mid-cap and large cap firms announcing a business alliance 
The below figure presents the comparison of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between mid-cap and 
large cap firms announcing a business alliance. The sub-samples include 232 announcements made by mid-cap 
firms and 791 announcements made by large cap firms during 2000-2018 in the Nordic stock market. The event 
window illustrated is the 21-day period around the announcement date [-10, 10]. The estimation models used to 
derive the abnormal returns are the market model, the market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, 
respectively. The averages of the estimation models for each sub-sample and the difference between the sub-
samples’ model averages is demonstrated. 
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Table 7: Small and large cap firms announcing a business alliance 
The below table presents the comparison between the cumulative abnormal average returns (CAAR) of small cap and large cap firms announcing a business alliance. The 
comparison utilizes the average of the three estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson 
beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. 
The sub-samples consist of 241 announcements made by small cap firms and 791 announcements made by large cap firms in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
Median Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.12% (0.839) -0.56% (0.496) 0.22% (0.134) 0.19% (0.075) * -0.10% (0.880) -0.75% (0.082) *
[-10, -1] 1.88% (0.037) ** 0.50% (0.374) 0.02% (0.905) 0.18% (0.836) 1.86% (0.045) ** 0.33% (0.691)
[-5, -1] 1.74% (0.027) ** -0.26% (0.613) -0.21% (0.176) -0.18% (0.112) 1.95% (0.015) ** -0.08% (0.529)
[-3, -1] 1.63% (0.022) ** -0.04% (0.194) -0.18% (0.145) -0.11% (0.120) 1.81% (0.012) ** 0.08% (0.162)
[-1] 0.98% (0.020) ** 0.01% (0.122) -0.08% (0.168) -0.03% (0.152) 1.06% (0.013) ** 0.05% (0.097) *
[-10, 10] 5.96% (0.000) *** 1.31% (0.011) ** -0.11% (0.697) -0.07% (0.689) 6.07% (0.000) *** 1.38% (0.014) **
[-5, 5] 5.50% (0.000) *** 1.77% (0.000) *** -0.14% (0.541) -0.25% (0.478) 5.63% (0.000) *** 2.02% (0.000) ***
[-3, 3] 6.69% (0.000) *** 2.49% (0.000) *** 0.04% (0.822) -0.10% (0.785) 6.65% (0.000) *** 2.59% (0.000) ***
[-1, 0] 4.85% (0.000) *** 1.44% (0.000) *** 0.14% (0.108) 0.10% (0.098) * 4.71% (0.000) *** 1.35% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 5.74% (0.000) *** 1.68% (0.000) *** 0.20% (0.087) * 0.10% (0.111) 5.54% (0.000) *** 1.58% (0.000) ***
[0] 3.87% (0.000) *** 0.76% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.003) *** 0.08% (0.042) ** 3.65% (0.000) *** 0.67% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 4.76% (0.000) *** 0.99% (0.000) *** 0.28% (0.011) ** 0.09% (0.031) ** 4.47% (0.000) *** 0.90% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.89% (0.029) ** 0.07% (0.162) 0.06% (0.449) -0.01% (0.822) 0.83% (0.046) ** 0.08% (0.302)
[1, 3] 1.19% (0.026) ** 0.20% (0.207) 0.00% (0.982) -0.08% (0.593) 1.19% (0.030) ** 0.28% (0.191)
[1, 5] -0.11% (0.828) -0.44% (0.193) -0.15% (0.317) -0.23% (0.057) * 0.04% (0.942) -0.21% (0.333)
[1, 10] 0.21% (0.779) -0.54% (0.309) -0.36% (0.089) * -0.26% (0.041) ** 0.57% (0.459) -0.28% (0.531)
[4, 5] -1.30% (0.001) *** -0.69% (0.003) *** -0.15% (0.091) * -0.13% (0.085) * -1.15% (0.004) *** -0.55% (0.006) ***
[5, 10] -0.61% (0.348) -1.30% (0.004) *** -0.27% (0.113) 0.00% (0.240) -0.34% (0.609) -1.30% (0.003) ***
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
c
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is zero using the Welch’s t-test.
d
 The statistical significance for the median difference is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for two unpaired samples using the normal  
   distribution approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the medians is zero.
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Table 8: Mid- and large cap firms announcing a business alliance 
The below table presents the comparison between the cumulative abnormal average returns (CAAR) of mid-cap and large cap firms announcing a business alliance. The 
comparison utilizes the average of the three estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson 
beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. 
The sub-samples consist of 232 announcements made by mid-cap firms and 791 announcements made by large cap firms in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
Median Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.13% (0.717) 0.29% (0.553) 0.22% (0.134) 0.19% (0.075) * -0.08% (0.832) 0.10% (0.963)
[-10, -1] 0.09% (0.854) 0.47% (0.553) 0.02% (0.905) 0.18% (0.836) 0.06% (0.904) 0.30% (0.456)
[-5, -1] -0.06% (0.853) -0.77% (0.330) -0.21% (0.176) -0.18% (0.112) 0.15% (0.689) -0.59% (0.478)
[-3, -1] -0.29% (0.260) -0.41% (0.223) -0.18% (0.145) -0.11% (0.120) -0.11% (0.705) -0.30% (0.509)
[-1] -0.20% (0.206) -0.20% (0.125) -0.08% (0.168) -0.03% (0.152) -0.11% (0.489) -0.17% (0.285)
[-10, 10] 1.20% (0.091) * 0.74% (0.052) * -0.11% (0.697) -0.07% (0.689) 1.31% (0.087) * 0.81% (0.044) **
[-5, 5] 0.93% (0.116) 0.40% (0.123) -0.14% (0.541) -0.25% (0.478) 1.06% (0.091) * 0.65% (0.080) *
[-3, 3] 1.06% (0.024) ** 0.44% (0.107) 0.04% (0.822) -0.10% (0.785) 1.02% (0.043) ** 0.54% (0.201)
[-1, 0] 0.93% (0.000) *** 0.34% (0.009) *** 0.14% (0.108) 0.10% (0.098) * 0.79% (0.004) *** 0.24% (0.089) *
[-1, 1] 0.98% (0.012) ** 0.01% (0.062) * 0.20% (0.087) * 0.10% (0.111) 0.78% (0.057) * -0.09% (0.305)
[0] 1.13% (0.000) *** 0.28% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.003) *** 0.08% (0.042) ** 0.91% (0.000) *** 0.20% (0.004) ***
[0, 1] 1.18% (0.002) *** 0.13% (0.036) ** 0.28% (0.011) ** 0.09% (0.031) ** 0.90% (0.023) ** 0.05% (0.301)
[1] 0.05% (0.840) -0.26% (0.074) * 0.06% (0.449) -0.01% (0.822) -0.01% (0.969) -0.25% (0.044) **
[1, 3] 0.22% (0.523) -0.17% (0.478) 0.00% (0.982) -0.08% (0.593) 0.22% (0.545) -0.09% (0.547)
[1, 5] -0.14% (0.755) -0.26% (0.445) -0.15% (0.317) -0.23% (0.057) * 0.01% (0.990) -0.04% (0.941)
[1, 10] -0.02% (0.975) 0.15% (0.920) -0.36% (0.089) * -0.26% (0.041) ** 0.35% (0.535) 0.41% (0.321)
[4, 5] -0.36% (0.262) -0.18% (0.512) -0.15% (0.091) * -0.13% (0.085) * -0.21% (0.519) -0.04% (0.835)
[5, 10] 0.00% (0.992) 0.05% (0.846) -0.27% (0.113) 0.00% (0.240) 0.27% (0.523) 0.05% (0.514)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
c
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is zero using the Welch’s t-test.
d
 The statistical significance for the median difference is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for two unpaired samples using the normal  
   distribution approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the medians is zero.
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6.4 Domestic and international business alliance announcements 
Previous literature has shown mixed findings for domestic and international business alliances 
regarding their abnormal returns. To test Hypothesis 4a of a premium for domestic partners, the 
sample is first divided into international and domestic business alliance announcements by the 
partners’ home countries. Figure 7 and Table 9, respectively, present the comparison between 
the cumulative average abnormal returns of business alliances with domestic and foreign 
partners. The average of the three estimation models is utilized for comparison. Table 20 and 
Table 21 in the Appendix provide further details on each respective estimation model used to 
derive the abnormal returns. 
 
Figure 7: Firms announcing a business alliance with domestic and international partners 
The below table presents the comparison between the cumulative abnormal average returns (CAAR) of firms 
announcing a business alliance with a domestic (PADOM) and an international partner (PAINT). The sub-samples 
include 148 business alliance announcements with a domestic partner and 1116 alliance announcements with a 
foreign partner during 2000-2018 in the Nordic stock market. The event window illustrated is the 21-day period 
around the announcement date [-10, 10]. The estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns are the market 
model, the market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. The averages of the estimation 
models for each sub-sample and the difference between the sub-samples’ model averages is demonstrated. 
 
 
The results show that business alliance announcements with both domestic and international 
partners generate positive cumulative average abnormal returns in the proximity of the 
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announcement date [0] where both types generate positive abnormal returns. For instance, 
business alliances with domestic partners produce on average 2.08% and alliances with 
international partners 1.31% positive cumulative average abnormal returns in the three-day 
announcement period [-1, 1]. However, in the entire 21-day event window, business alliances 
with a domestic partner show a negative -0.37% cumulative average abnormal return and 
business alliances with a foreign partner show a positive 1.50% abnormal return. Business 
alliances with a foreign partner seem to especially outperform alliances with domestic partners 
in the pre-event and post-event timelines. The differences are not statistically significant in the 
pre-event window but the negative effect is very prominent during the post-event timeframe of 
ten days after the announcement [1, 10] where the difference in the cumulative average 
abnormal returns of the announcements is -1.63% and statistically very significant. However, 
the difference of the medians does not support the finding. Furthermore, due to the small sample 
size and due to the fact that the negative cumulative average abnormal returns seem to occur 
after the announcement date, no decisive conclusion can be drawn on the apparent 
outperforming of business alliances with a foreign partner compared to domestic partners. Still, 
given the results, there is no support for Hypothesis 4a implying a premium for domestic 
partners as business alliances with domestic partners seem to rather underperform than 
outperform compared to business alliances with foreign partners. However, the sample size for 
domestic partners is very small with only 148 observations which may cause serious variability 
concerning the results due to possible extreme outlier observations. 
 
Next, I will examine the effect of internationality measured by the location of the business 
alliance to test Hypothesis 4b. The business alliance is considered purely international if both 
partners and the business alliance are located in different countries. Otherwise, the alliance is 
considered domestic as at least one of the partners is not expanding to new markets. Figure 8 
and Table 10, respectively, present the comparison between the cumulative average abnormal 
returns of business alliances formed domestically in respect to at least one of the partners and 
those that are formed completely internationally. Table 22 and Table 23 in the Appendix 
provide further details on the respective estimation models used to derive the cumulative 
average abnormal returns. 
 
The division of the sample into domestic and international business alliances gives different 
results this time around when internationality is defined in respect to the location of the alliance 
and not of the partner. In cases where either the firm, the partner, or both are announcing a 
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business alliance domestically the cumulative average abnormal returns seem to be greater. For 
instance, given the criteria, domestic business alliances generate a cumulative average abnormal 
return of 1.68% during the entire event window [-10, 10] and during the three-day 
announcement period [-1, 1] they produce a cumulative average return of 1.65%. The results 
for completely international business alliances are 0.84% in the entire 21-day event window [-
10, 10] and 1.11% in the three-day announcement period [-1, 1]. Both types experience 
significant returns in timeframes including the announcement date [0] also supported by the 
median values. However, the differences between the groups are only statistically significant in 
pre-event timelines.  
 
Figure 8: Firms announcing a business alliance domestically and internationally 
The below table presents the comparison between the cumulative abnormal average returns (CAAR) of firms 
announcing a business alliance where either the firm or the partner, or both, are located in the same country as the 
respective alliance (BADOM) and firms announcing a business alliance where both the partners and the respective 
alliance are all located in a different country (BAINT). Given the criteria, the sub-samples include 672 domestic 
business alliance announcements and 592 international business alliance announcements during 2000-2018 in the 
Nordic stock market. The event window illustrated is the 21-day period around the announcement date [-10, 10]. 
The estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns are the market model, the market-adjusted model, and 
the Dimson beta model, respectively. The averages of the estimation models for each sub-sample and the difference 
between the sub-samples’ model averages is demonstrated. 
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The most significant difference happens during the timeline of five days before the business 
alliance announcement [-5, -1] where domestic business alliances outperform international ones 
by 0.94%. However, the median values do not support this significant difference between the 
groups in the pre-event timeline. Overall, given the results, it seems that domestic business 
alliances perform better than international ones but there is not enough evidence to support an 
argument that the effect is significant. Therefore, the evidence seems to be in favour of 
Hypothesis 4b of no significant differences between the groups.  
 
In common with the findings of previous literature, my evidence on both international and 
domestic partners as well as international and domestic business alliances by the location of the 
alliance yielded mixed results. It seems domestic business alliances underperform when 
internationality is measured with the location of the partner but outperform when 
internationality is measured with the location of the business alliance. However, the differences 
in neither case are statistically significant to make any decisive conclusions. 
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Table 9: Firms announcing a business alliance with domestic and international partners 
The below table presents the comparison between the cumulative abnormal average returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance with a domestic or an international 
partner. The comparison utilizes the average of the three estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and 
the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-
260, -11]. The sub-samples consist of 148 announcements with domestic partners and 1116 announcements with foreign partners in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
Median Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.04% (0.926) -0.04% (0.803) 0.21% (0.244) 0.12% (0.288) -0.17% (0.713) -0.17% (0.914)
[-10, -1] -0.09% (0.886) -0.21% (0.387) 0.45% (0.067) * 0.27% (0.260) -0.54% (0.419) -0.48% (0.190)
[-5, -1] 0.10% (0.851) -0.71% (0.085) * 0.20% (0.324) -0.18% (0.302) -0.10% (0.870) -0.53% (0.176)
[-3, -1] 0.03% (0.953) -0.53% (0.170) 0.16% (0.355) -0.12% (0.441) -0.14% (0.779) -0.41% (0.267)
[-1] 0.41% (0.139) -0.04% (0.888) 0.06% (0.551) -0.04% (0.223) 0.35% (0.233) 0.00% (0.678)
[-10, 10] -0.37% (0.723) -0.54% (0.412) 1.50% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.036) ** -1.87% (0.094) * -0.81% (0.155)
[-5, 5] 0.88% (0.359) -0.37% (0.495) 1.17% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.022) ** -0.29% (0.773) -0.60% (0.145)
[-3, 3] 1.67% (0.080) * 0.28% (0.451) 1.47% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 0.20% (0.841) 0.03% (0.636)
[-1, 0] 1.76% (0.013) ** 0.15% (0.197) 1.11% (0.000) *** 0.25% (0.000) *** 0.65% (0.369) -0.10% (0.675)
[-1, 1] 2.08% (0.018) ** -0.15% (0.454) 1.31% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.000) *** 0.77% (0.393) -0.42% (0.385)
[0] 1.35% (0.031) ** 0.05% (0.306) 1.05% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) *** 0.30% (0.640) -0.17% (0.373)
[0, 1] 1.67% (0.036) ** -0.03% (0.518) 1.25% (0.000) *** 0.19% (0.000) *** 0.42% (0.610) -0.22% (0.249)
[1] 0.32% (0.383) -0.04% (0.651) 0.20% (0.056) * -0.02% (0.917) 0.12% (0.759) -0.03% (0.642)
[1, 3] 0.29% (0.500) 0.19% (0.741) 0.26% (0.087) * -0.08% (0.770) 0.03% (0.941) 0.27% (0.662)
[1, 5] -0.58% (0.283) -0.33% (0.142) -0.08% (0.616) -0.24% (0.040) ** -0.50% (0.378) -0.09% (0.486)
[1, 10] -1.63% (0.011) ** -0.03% (0.217) 0.00% (0.998) -0.32% (0.077) * -1.63% (0.017) ** 0.28% (0.531)
[4, 5] -0.87% (0.009) *** -0.52% (0.012) ** -0.34% (0.003) *** -0.15% (0.021) ** -0.53% (0.131) -0.37% (0.096) *
[5, 10] -1.33% (0.010) *** -0.27% (0.084) * -0.14% (0.450) -0.12% (0.045) ** -1.19% (0.030) ** -0.15% (0.318)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
c
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is zero using the Welch’s t-test.
d
 The statistical significance for the median difference is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for two unpaired samples using the normal  
   distribution approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the medians is zero.
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Table 10: Firms announcing a business alliance domestically and internationally 
The below table presents the comparison between the cumulative abnormal average returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance where either the firm or the partner, 
or both, are located in the same country as the respective alliance and firms announcing a business alliance where both the partners and the alliance are all located in a different 
country. The comparison utilizes the average of the three estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and 
the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-
260, -11]. The sub-samples consist of 672 domestic business alliance announcements and 592 international business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 
2000-2018. 
Median Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.38% (0.087) * 0.15% (0.081) * -0.03% (0.886) -0.04% (0.730) 0.41% (0.205) 0.20% (0.155)
[-10, -1] 0.91% (0.008) *** 0.40% (0.241) -0.20% (0.514) 0.03% (0.848) 1.11% (0.015) ** 0.37% (0.313)
[-5, -1] 0.63% (0.033) ** -0.25% (0.397) -0.31% (0.164) -0.26% (0.168) 0.94% (0.011) ** 0.01% (0.746)
[-3, -1] 0.46% (0.072) * -0.18% (0.299) -0.21% (0.257) -0.12% (0.500) 0.68% (0.034) ** -0.06% (0.843)
[-1] 0.23% (0.139) -0.02% (0.673) -0.04% (0.662) -0.09% (0.235) 0.27% (0.138) 0.07% (0.605)
[-10, 10] 1.68% (0.003) *** 0.03% (0.132) 0.84% (0.070) * 0.26% (0.346) 0.84% (0.254) -0.23% (0.716)
[-5, 5] 1.54% (0.001) *** 0.15% (0.202) 0.67% (0.046) ** 0.17% (0.145) 0.88% (0.130) -0.02% (0.858)
[-3, 3] 1.95% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.004) *** 0.98% (0.001) *** 0.19% (0.020) ** 0.97% (0.078) * 0.09% (0.689)
[-1, 0] 1.34% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.000) *** 1.01% (0.000) *** 0.25% (0.000) *** 0.32% (0.364) -0.02% (0.984)
[-1, 1] 1.65% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) *** 1.11% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.001) *** 0.54% (0.211) -0.01% (0.868)
[0] 1.11% (0.000) *** 0.18% (0.000) *** 1.06% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) *** 0.05% (0.867) -0.04% (0.636)
[0, 1] 1.43% (0.000) *** 0.14% (0.000) *** 1.16% (0.000) *** 0.18% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.499) -0.04% (0.934)
[1] 0.32% (0.043) ** 0.05% (0.443) 0.10% (0.431) -0.08% (0.350) 0.22% (0.281) 0.13% (0.228)
[1, 3] 0.38% (0.064) * 0.07% (0.372) 0.14% (0.499) -0.24% (0.238) 0.24% (0.402) 0.31% (0.144)
[1, 5] -0.20% (0.387) -0.19% (0.126) -0.08% (0.724) -0.36% (0.056) * -0.12% (0.706) 0.17% (0.802)
[1, 10] -0.34% (0.270) -0.13% (0.130) -0.02% (0.952) -0.40% (0.156) -0.32% (0.450) 0.27% (0.942)
[4, 5] -0.57% (0.001) *** -0.28% (0.002) *** -0.21% (0.135) -0.12% (0.267) -0.36% (0.099) * -0.16% (0.150)
[5, 10] -0.42% (0.107) -0.17% (0.040) ** -0.13% (0.590) -0.13% (0.175) -0.29% (0.413) -0.04% (0.630)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
c
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is zero using the Welch’s t-test.
d
 The statistical significance for the median difference is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for two unpaired samples using the normal  
   distribution approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the medians is zero.
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6.5 Related and unrelated business alliance announcements 
Prior studies have obtained mixed results concerning the effect of relatedness on business 
alliance performance. My Hypotheses 5a and 5b suggested that partner relatedness should not 
have a significant effect on the cumulative average abnormal return, but related business 
alliances were expected to perform better. First, to test Hypothesis 5a of no significant 
difference between related and unrelated partners, the sample is divided in respect to partner 
relatedness specified by three-digit SIC code matching. Figure 9 and Table 11, respectively, 
present the comparison between the cumulative average abnormal returns of firms announcing 
a business alliance with a related partner and those announcing an alliance with an unrelated 
partner. Table 24 and Table 25 in the Appendix provide further details on each respective 
estimation model. 
 
Figure 9: Firms announcing a business alliance with related and unrelated partners 
The below figure presents the comparison of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between firms 
announcing a business alliance with a related (PAREL) and an unrelated partner (PAUREL). The partners are 
considered related if their primary three-digit SIC codes match. The sub-samples include 391 business alliance 
announcements by related partners and 873 by unrelated partners during 2000-2018 in the Nordic stock market. 
The event window illustrated is the 21-day period around the announcement date [-10, 10]. The estimation models 
used to derive the abnormal returns are the market model, the market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, 
respectively. The averages of the estimation models for each sub-sample and the difference between the sub-
samples’ model averages is demonstrated. 
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Observing the results presented by Figure 9 and Table 11, business alliances announced by 
related partners experience similar trends as alliances announced by unrelated partners. 
Business alliances announced by related partners produce a cumulative average abnormal return 
of 1.77% during the entire 21-day event window [-10, 10]. The average for the three-day 
announcement period [-1, 1] is 1.70%. The respective results for unrelated partners are 1.07% 
during the 21-day event window [-10, 10] and 1.27% during the three-day announcement period 
[-1, 1]. Results for both types in the timeframes around the announcement date [0] are 
statistically significant also supported by the median values. Both types also experience pre-
event positive returns and post-event negative returns, but the effect is only significant four to 
five days after the announcement [4, 5] where related partners generate a negative -0.48% and 
unrelated partners a negative -0.37% cumulative average abnormal return. The results are only 
statistically significant for unrelated partners considering the median values. When observing 
differences between the groups, statistical significance is only observed during the 
announcement date [0] where related partners outperform unrelated ones by a 0.82% margin. 
However, the median value is not supportive of the observed difference. Overall, considering 
the findings, business alliances with related partners seem to outperform alliances with 
unrelated partners but the differences are not statistically very significant except exactly during 
the announcement date when observing mean differences. However, the evidence is overall 
supportive of Hypothesis 5a of no significant differences between related and unrelated 
partners. 
 
Next, to test Hypothesis 5b, which suggested higher abnormal returns for firms forming a 
business alliance in a related industry, the sample is divided into firms announcing a business 
alliance in a related and in an unrelated industry specified by three-digit SIC code matching. 
The criteria of a related business alliance are met if one or both the partners share a primary 
SIC code with the business alliance. Figure 10 and Table 12, respectively, present the 
comparison between the cumulative average abnormal returns of firms announcing a business 
alliance in a related industry and those announcing an alliance in an unrelated industry. Table 
26 and Table 27 in the Appendix provide further details on each respective estimation model 
used to derive the abnormal returns. 
 
Given the results presented in Figure 10 and Table 12, the related business alliances seem to 
outperform unrelated ones in the timeline before the announcement. The difference is 
statistically significant five to ten days before the announcement [-10, -5] by examining both 
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the mean and the median. However, especially during timeframes including the event, unrelated 
business alliances outperform related ones. For instance, during the three-day announcement 
period [-1, 1] unrelated business alliances generate a cumulative average abnormal return of 
1.73% whereas related business alliances generate an average of 0.97%. The difference is 
statistically significant by observing both the mean and the median. However, given the entire 
21-day event window, both types of business alliances experience almost equal cumulative 
average abnormal returns, 1.26% for related business alliances and 1.30% for unrelated 
business alliances. Given the overall picture, there does not seem to exist a related business 
alliance premium as was suggested by Hypothesis 5b. 
 
Figure 10: Firms announcing a business alliance in related and unrelated industries 
The below figure presents the comparison of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between firms 
announcing a business alliance in a related (BAREL) and an unrelated industry (BAUREL). The business alliance 
is considered related if one or both of the partners’ primary three-digit SIC codes match with the primary three-
digit SIC code of the business alliance. Given the criteria, the sub-samples include 550 related business alliance 
announcements and 714 unrelated business alliance announcements during 2000-2018 in the Nordic stock market. 
The event window illustrated is the 21-day period around the announcement date [-10, 10]. The estimation models 
used to derive the abnormal returns are the market model, the market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, 
respectively. The averages of the estimation models for each sub-sample and the difference between the sub-
samples’ model averages is demonstrated. 
 
56 
 
 
 
Table 11: Firms announcing a business alliance with related and unrelated partners 
The below table presents the comparison between the cumulative abnormal average returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance with a related and an unrelated 
partner. The partners are considered related if their three-digit SIC codes match. The comparison utilizes the average of the three estimation models used to derive the abnormal 
returns. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation 
period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sub-samples consist of 391 business alliance announcements with a related partner and 
873 announcements with an unrelated partner in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
Median Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.34% (0.225) 0.20% (0.254) 0.12% (0.563) 0.04% (0.614) 0.23% (0.510) 0.16% (0.444)
[-10, -1] 0.17% (0.701) 0.29% (0.948) 0.49% (0.071) * 0.17% (0.371) -0.32% (0.530) 0.11% (0.633)
[-5, -1] -0.08% (0.821) -0.35% (0.213) 0.31% (0.161) -0.22% (0.288) -0.39% (0.359) -0.14% (0.435)
[-3, -1] -0.21% (0.496) -0.35% (0.099) * 0.31% (0.109) -0.12% (0.771) -0.52% (0.156) -0.23% (0.142)
[-1] -0.10% (0.488) -0.07% (0.194) 0.19% (0.103) -0.03% (0.668) -0.30% (0.121) -0.04% (0.298)
[-10, 10] 1.77% (0.018) ** 0.47% (0.201) 1.07% (0.012) ** 0.08% (0.245) 0.71% (0.411) 0.39% (0.662)
[-5, 5] 1.43% (0.014) ** -0.14% (0.168) 1.00% (0.004) *** 0.25% (0.158) 0.43% (0.522) -0.38% (0.702)
[-3, 3] 1.78% (0.001) *** 0.20% (0.044) ** 1.37% (0.000) *** 0.28% (0.002) *** 0.41% (0.510) -0.08% (0.920)
[-1, 0] 1.55% (0.000) *** 0.33% (0.001) *** 1.02% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) *** 0.53% (0.231) 0.11% (0.582)
[-1, 1] 1.70% (0.000) *** 0.15% (0.005) *** 1.27% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 0.43% (0.412) -0.09% (0.785)
[0] 1.65% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) *** 0.83% (0.000) *** 0.17% (0.000) *** 0.82% (0.045) ** 0.09% (0.223)
[0, 1] 1.80% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.001) *** 1.08% (0.000) *** 0.14% (0.000) *** 0.72% (0.142) 0.08% (0.566)
[1] 0.15% (0.481) -0.10% (0.618) 0.25% (0.033) ** 0.00% (0.760) -0.10% (0.673) -0.10% (0.516)
[1, 3] 0.34% (0.236) -0.32% (0.317) 0.23% (0.159) 0.03% (0.586) 0.11% (0.745) -0.35% (0.222)
[1, 5] -0.14% (0.655) -0.48% (0.068) * -0.14% (0.438) -0.15% (0.105) 0.00% (0.996) -0.33% (0.431)
[1, 10] -0.05% (0.909) -0.21% (0.425) -0.25% (0.305) -0.26% (0.049) ** 0.21% (0.677) 0.05% (0.698)
[4, 5] -0.48% (0.051) * -0.12% (0.166) -0.37% (0.001) *** -0.20% (0.006) *** -0.10% (0.698) 0.08% (0.790)
[5, 10] -0.24% (0.500) -0.12% (0.298) -0.30% (0.136) -0.21% (0.022) ** 0.06% (0.873) 0.08% (0.678)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
c
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is zero using the Welch’s t-test.
d
 The statistical significance for the median difference is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for two unpaired samples using the normal  
   distribution approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the medians is zero.
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Table 12: Firms announcing a business alliance in related and unrelated industries 
The below table presents the comparison of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between firms announcing a business alliance in a related and an unrelated industry. 
The business alliance is considered related if one or both of the partners’ primary three-digit SIC codes match with the primary three-digit SIC code of the business alliance, 
otherwise the business alliance is considered unrelated. The comparison utilizes the average of the three estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns. The models are 
the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model 
estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sub-samples consist of 550 related business alliance announcements and 714 unrelated business alliance 
announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
Median Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.61% (0.005) *** 0.33% (0.008) *** -0.14% (0.542) -0.06% (0.370) 0.75% (0.019) ** 0.39% (0.011) **
[-10, -1] 0.53% (0.100) * 0.32% (0.235) 0.28% (0.385) 0.12% (0.949) 0.25% (0.588) 0.21% (0.333)
[-5, -1] -0.19% (0.468) -0.42% (0.072) * 0.48% (0.075) * -0.18% (0.623) -0.67% (0.074) * -0.25% (0.241)
[-3, -1] -0.06% (0.773) -0.20% (0.081) * 0.31% (0.201) -0.11% (0.945) -0.37% (0.250) -0.09% (0.204)
[-1] 0.02% (0.863) -0.09% (0.254) 0.16% (0.240) -0.01% (0.653) -0.14% (0.439) -0.08% (0.589)
[-10, 10] 1.26% (0.016) ** -0.06% (0.625) 1.30% (0.013) ** 0.34% (0.069) * -0.04% (0.962) -0.39% (0.397)
[-5, 5] 0.67% (0.093) * -0.10% (0.983) 1.49% (0.001) *** 0.30% (0.011) ** -0.83% (0.157) -0.40% (0.083) *
[-3, 3] 0.91% (0.012) ** -0.08% (0.582) 1.95% (0.000) *** 0.67% (0.000) *** -1.03% (0.061) * -0.76% (0.010) **
[-1, 0] 0.76% (0.001) *** 0.10% (0.056) * 1.51% (0.000) *** 0.34% (0.000) *** -0.75% (0.034) ** -0.23% (0.037) **
[-1, 1] 0.97% (0.000) *** 0.07% (0.067) * 1.73% (0.000) *** 0.33% (0.000) *** -0.76% (0.075) * -0.26% (0.050) **
[0] 0.74% (0.001) *** 0.08% (0.032) ** 1.35% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) *** -0.61% (0.055) * -0.18% (0.019) **
[0, 1] 0.95% (0.000) *** 0.03% (0.061) * 1.57% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.000) *** -0.62% (0.118) -0.24% (0.040) **
[1] 0.21% (0.113) -0.02% (0.902) 0.22% (0.143) -0.03% (0.985) -0.01% (0.970) 0.01% (0.938)
[1, 3] 0.23% (0.250) -0.07% (0.855) 0.29% (0.152) -0.07% (0.973) -0.05% (0.851) 0.00% (0.896)
[1, 5] 0.12% (0.587) -0.09% (0.291) -0.34% (0.138) -0.41% (0.024) ** 0.45% (0.145) 0.32% (0.440)
[1, 10] 0.00% (0.988) -0.23% (0.191) -0.33% (0.270) -0.26% (0.102) 0.33% (0.442) 0.02% (0.850)
[4, 5] -0.12% (0.403) -0.15% (0.232) -0.62% (0.000) *** -0.20% (0.003) *** 0.51% (0.018) ** 0.06% (0.254)
[5, 10] -0.30% (0.219) -0.24% (0.010) ** -0.27% (0.285) -0.09% (0.277) -0.03% (0.931) -0.15% (0.280)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
c
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is zero using the Welch’s t-test.
d
 The statistical significance for the median difference is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for two unpaired samples using the normal  
   distribution approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the medians is zero.
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6.6 High-technology business alliance announcements 
Previous research has implied that high-technology business alliances generate greater 
cumulative average abnormal returns compared to other types of business alliances. To test 
Hypothesis 6 of a high-tech premium, the sample is divided into high-technology business 
alliances and other alliances by their three-digit SIC codes. The criteria of being considered 
high-technology is obtained from Kile and Philips’ (2009) benchmark optimization of high-
technology three-digit SIC codes. Figure 11 and Table 13, respectively, present the comparison 
between the cumulative average abnormal returns of firms announcing high-technology 
business alliances and those announcing other types of business alliances. Table 28 and Table 
29 in the Appendix provide further details on each respective estimation model. 
 
Figure 11: Firms announcing a business alliance in high-tech and other industries 
The below figure presents the comparison of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between firms 
announcing a business alliance in high-technology industries and in other industries. The business alliance is 
considered high-tech if it meets Kile and Philips’ (2009) three-digit SIC code criteria. The sub-samples include 
511 high-technology business alliance announcements and 753 other business alliance announcements during 
2000-2018 in the Nordic stock market. The event window illustrated is the 21-day period around the announcement 
date [-10, 10]. The estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns are the market model, the market-
adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. The averages of the estimation models for each sub-
sample and the difference between the sub-samples’ model averages is demonstrated. 
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By examining the findings illustrated in Figure 11 and Table 13, it can be observed that business 
alliances formed in high-technology industries underperform compared to business alliances in 
other industries. There are no significant differences in the pre-event and post-event timelines, 
but the differential effect occurs during timeframes including the announcement date. The 
difference is most significant in the three-day announcement period [-1, 1] where the difference 
is 0.95% in favour of non-high-technology business alliances. The median values also support 
this finding. However, considering the entire 21-day event window [-10, 10], the difference is 
not statistically significant, although noticeable, as high-technology business alliances 
underperform by 1.21% on average and by 0.84% considering the median. 
 
The finding of high-technology business alliance underperformance is in contrast with most of 
previous literature. Some explanations could include investor scepticism towards the high-
technology sector after the burst of the dot-com bubble in the early 2000s. This may have guided 
investors to be more careful when investing in highly risky technological ventures. Hypothesis 
6 suggested a premium for high-technology business alliances. However, my results are not 
supportive of the hypothesis. In contrast, my results generally imply an opposite effect of high-
technology underperformance. 
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Table 13: Firms announcing a business alliance in high-tech and other industries 
The below table presents the comparison of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between firms announcing a business alliance in high-technology industries and in 
other industries. The business alliance is considered high-tech if it meets Kile and Philips’ (2009) three-digit SIC code criteria. The comparison utilizes the average of the three 
estimation models used to derive the abnormal returns. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the 
announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sub-samples consist of 511 high-
technology business alliance announcements and 753 other alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
Median Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.38% (0.135) 0.30% (0.067) * 0.06% (0.791) -0.03% (0.891) 0.32% (0.334) 0.34% (0.133)
[-10, -1] 0.26% (0.447) 0.26% (0.387) 0.48% (0.124) 0.16% (0.810) -0.22% (0.624) 0.10% (0.648)
[-5, -1] -0.10% (0.716) -0.49% (0.094) * 0.38% (0.145) -0.17% (0.518) -0.48% (0.200) -0.32% (0.393)
[-3, -1] -0.16% (0.461) -0.27% (0.128) 0.35% (0.126) -0.10% (0.762) -0.51% (0.105) -0.17% (0.313)
[-1] -0.04% (0.746) -0.05% (0.221) 0.19% (0.148) -0.02% (0.669) -0.23% (0.194) -0.02% (0.461)
[-10, 10] 0.57% (0.310) -0.21% (0.979) 1.77% (0.000) *** 0.63% (0.027) ** -1.21% (0.106) -0.84% (0.153)
[-5, 5] 0.49% (0.231) -0.32% (0.806) 1.57% (0.000) *** 0.48% (0.007) *** -1.08% (0.065) * -0.80% (0.059) *
[-3, 3] 0.77% (0.038) ** -0.21% (0.709) 1.99% (0.000) *** 0.69% (0.000) *** -1.21% (0.027) ** -0.91% (0.011) **
[-1, 0] 0.79% (0.002) *** 0.08% (0.114) 1.45% (0.000) *** 0.38% (0.000) *** -0.66% (0.064) * -0.30% (0.028) **
[-1, 1] 0.83% (0.002) *** 0.08% (0.164) 1.79% (0.000) *** 0.34% (0.000) *** -0.95% (0.024) ** -0.26% (0.024) **
[0] 0.83% (0.000) *** 0.09% (0.014) ** 1.26% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** -0.43% (0.185) -0.15% (0.106)
[0, 1] 0.87% (0.001) *** 0.10% (0.017) ** 1.59% (0.000) *** 0.21% (0.000) *** -0.72% (0.065) * -0.11% (0.214)
[1] 0.04% (0.708) -0.08% (0.517) 0.33% (0.031) ** 0.00% (0.648) -0.29% (0.124) -0.08% (0.437)
[1, 3] 0.10% (0.621) -0.07% (0.641) 0.37% (0.057) * -0.07% (0.855) -0.27% (0.339) 0.00% (0.593)
[1, 5] -0.24% (0.306) -0.40% (0.027) ** -0.07% (0.735) -0.18% (0.200) -0.17% (0.592) -0.22% (0.351)
[1, 10] -0.52% (0.125) -0.43% (0.037) ** 0.03% (0.906) -0.11% (0.333) -0.55% (0.208) -0.33% (0.316)
[4, 5] -0.34% (0.056) * -0.21% (0.064) * -0.45% (0.001) *** -0.17% (0.016) ** 0.10% (0.651) -0.04% (0.890)
[5, 10] -0.50% (0.062) * -0.31% (0.005) *** -0.13% (0.574) -0.07% (0.366) -0.37% (0.298) -0.24% (0.116)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
c
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is zero using the Welch’s t-test.
d
 The statistical significance for the median difference is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for two unpaired samples using the normal  
   distribution approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between the medians is zero.
Pre-event
Event
Post-event
High-tech business alliance (N = 511) Other business alliance (N = 753) Difference CAAR
Event 
window Mean p
a
p
b
Mean p
a
p
b
Mean p
c
p
d
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6.7 Multiple regression results 
The multiple regression model’s purpose is to further test the implications of the hypotheses 
constructed earlier and to add statistical robustness to my findings. Table 14 presents the results 
of the multiple regression. The coefficient JV for joint ventures is insignificant, implying that 
there is no statistically significant difference between forming joint ventures and strategic 
alliances. Thus, the result is supportive of Hypothesis 2. The result is also in line with my 
previous findings illustrated in Figure 4 and Table 6 when comparing means and medians of 
joint ventures and strategic alliances.  
 
The overall picture given by the regression analysis is that the firm’s previous performance and 
the volatility associated with it are of important concern when investors consider the 
information provided by business alliance announcements. Firms that have performed subpar 
compared to the market benchmark experience greater abnormal returns from the 
announcements as is suggested by the control variable coefficient LTMDIF in Table 14. The 
finding is statistically significant during all event windows including the announcement date. 
The Nordic stock market seems to respond favorably to underperforming firms announcing a 
business alliance which could indicate that investors on average take the announcement as a 
positive signal suggesting that the firms in question are attempting to improve their profitability. 
Firms also experiencing greater annual volatility tend to produce greater cumulative abnormal 
returns from the business alliance announcements as suggested by the control variable 
coefficient LTMVOL in Table 14. This effect is likely explained by the fact that small firms 
often have greater volatility compared to larger firms, and as was witnessed earlier in my paper, 
small cap firms outperformed other firms by a large margin. Furthermore, the multiple 
regression results support the suggested finding of a small firm premium as the significance of 
the market value coefficient MV(LN) is statistically very high in all the models in Table 14. 
The larger the firm is measured by its market capitalization, the lower its cumulative abnormal 
returns are. Thus, the regression results are also supportive of Hypothesis 3 suggesting a small 
firm premium. The results earlier in Figure 5 and Table 7 also provide evidence for this 
conclusion. 
 
Furthermore, the multiple regression results imply, that when the partner of the business 
alliance is from a foreign country, the announcements tend to generate greater cumulative 
abnormal returns. The effect is statistically significant during the entire 21-day event window 
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[-10, 10] as shown in Table 14 in Model IV by the coefficient PAINT. The finding is similar to 
the results observed in Figure 7 and Table 9. Given the findings, there seems to be very little 
support for a premium considering domestic partners as suggested by Hypothesis 4a. 
Hypothesis 4b implied no significant difference between announcing a business alliance 
domestically or internationally. The implications of the multiple regression analysis are in line 
with the hypothesis as the coefficient BAINT for business alliance internationality is 
statistically insignificant. The findings in Figure 8 and Table 10 are also supportive of this 
conclusion. Even though business alliances domestically seem to outperform international ones, 
the differences are not statistically significant enough to reject Hypothesis 4b.  
 
Hypothesis 5a and 5b were concerned in the relatedness of the partner and the business alliance 
influencing the abnormal returns generated by the business alliance announcements. As shown 
in the regression results in Table 14, no significant effect is observed for the coefficients 
PAREL and BAREL regarding relatedness. The results discussed earlier in Figure 9, Figure 10, 
Table 11, and Table 12 also support the general insignificance of the relatedness criteria 
affecting the cumulative abnormal returns although some evidence of significant differences 
during a few specific event windows were detected. Finally, the multiple regression results offer 
some support for my earlier findings regarding business alliances’ subpar performance in the 
high-technology industry. Model I suggests that the negative effect of high-tech business 
alliances during the three-day announcement period [-1, 1] is statistically significant at the 10% 
level as suggested by the coefficient HITECH. However, no significant differences are observed 
in the broader event windows in Models II-IV. Overall, the results of the multiple regression 
model regarding high-technology business alliances do not offer evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 6 as high-tech business alliances seem to generally underperform. The negative 
difference between high-technology and other types of business alliances, especially around the 
announcement date, is also seen in Figure 11 and Table 13 earlier in my paper.
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Table 14: OLS multiple regression results 
The below table reports the OLS multiple regression results of 1245 business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 19 observations were 
omitted due to incomplete data. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of an observed firm. Model I examines the three-day [-1, 1] cumulative 
abnormal return around the announcement date [0] as the dependent variable. Models II-IV examine the 7-day [-3, 3], 11-day [-5, 5], and 21-day [-10, 10] cumulative abnormal 
returns. BTM is the firm’s book-to-market ratio, LTMDIF is the difference between the firm’s return and the market benchmark’s return during the estimation period, LTMVOL 
is the annualized volatility of the firm’s return during the estimation period, BAMANU is a dummy variable taking the value 1  if the business alliance announced is of 
manufacturing type, BAMARK is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the business alliance is of marketing type, BARND is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the 
business alliance is of research and development type, PAPRIV is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the partner is a private firm, JV is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if the business alliance is a joint venture, MV(LN) is the natural logarithm of the announcing firm’s market value, PAINT is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the partner 
is international, BAINT is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the business alliance is fully international, PAREL is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the partner is in 
a related industry, BAREL is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the business alliance is related to one or both partners, and HITECH is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if the business alliance’s industry is considered high-tech. The p-values and their statistical significance are also demonstrated. 
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7. Discussion 
 
Overall, the findings of my study indicated mixed results for the constructed hypotheses. Some 
hypotheses were easily confirmed but for the others I struggled to find definitive proof, and on 
some occasions, I ended up with results suggesting an opposite effect compared to the 
hypothesis’ implications. The analyses in my paper indicate that joint ventures and strategic 
alliances generally produce abnormal positive returns for the firms announcing them. The 
finding is in line with most of the previous literature which has suggested a positive market 
reaction for such announcements as was suggested by Hypothesis 1. However, the effect seems 
to be somewhat larger in my study of the Nordic market during the current millennium. Where 
other studies in the U.S. during different eras have generally found the positive market reaction 
to be lower than 1%, my results imply that the positive market effect is approximately 1.40% 
around the three days of the announcement date [-1. 1], and approximately 1.30% around the 
three weeks surrounding the announcement [-10, 10]. Given my findings, I feel confident in 
accepting Hypothesis 1 of general positive market reaction regarding business alliances in the 
Nordic stock market. However, when comparing the differences in cumulative average 
abnormal returns between two types of business alliances, joint ventures and strategic alliances 
precisely, I could not draw statistically significant results to support Hypothesis 2 of a joint 
venture premium. Neither the sub-sample analysis nor the results from the multiple regression 
yielded statistically significant results in favor of a joint venture premium. Therefore, relying 
on the entirety of my findings, Hypothesis 2 is rejected. 
 
The most striking finding in my study was the fact that small cap firms to generate higher 
returns than large cap firms by a large margin. The effect was statistically significant both in 
the sub-sample analysis and in the multiple regression analysis. The finding is also in line with 
previous literature which has widely documented the small firm premium. However, I find the 
premium to be larger than documented previously. The result could be explained by my 
sampling where I set a fixed threshold on market value, whereas prior studies have often used 
relative size in order to measure the small firm effect. The small firm premium effect persisted 
in the multiple regression analysis where no such artificial thresholds were placed. Other 
explanations for the premium might include behavioral investor biases. For instance, small 
firms make less announcements compared to larger firms which might amplify the impact of 
noise traders on the stock price. Furthermore, the announcement of a business alliance is usually 
more meaningful to a small firm and might signal better relative growth prospects and future 
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cash flows compared to larger firms. Given all the evidence, Hypothesis 2 of a small firm 
premium is accepted. 
 
My paper also examined the effect of internationality and industry relatedness on the 
cumulative average abnormal returns of firms announcing business alliances. The results 
suggested a premium for business alliances formed by companies that do not belong to the same 
nation. Both the sub-sample analysis and the regression analysis supported the finding during 
the entire 21-day event window [-10, 10], but the proof for other event windows was less 
exhaustive. Still, the findings are contradictory to Hypothesis 4a which implied a premium for 
domestically formed business alliances. My results mostly suggest the opposite in the Nordic 
stock market as business alliances with domestic partners seemed to rather underperform. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4a of a domestic partner premium is rejected as suggested by my 
evidence. I also examined the effect of internationality regarding the location of the business 
alliances. However, I was not able to find consistent proof that business alliances formed 
domestically or internationally would outperform neither in the sub-sample comparison nor in 
the multiple regression analysis. Thus, Hypothesis 4b of no significant difference between the 
two types is accepted.  
 
Regarding the relatedness of the business alliances announced, my paper examined the effect 
on two fronts. First, Hypothesis 5a suggested that business alliances formed by partners in 
related industries and in unrelated industries do not generate significantly different abnormal 
returns. Only the sub-sample analysis presents a significant difference during the announcement 
date [0] in favor of related partners. Otherwise, the entirety of the findings is statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 5a of no significant differences is accepted. Hypothesis 5b 
examined the effect of the business alliance’s relatedness on the cumulative average abnormal 
returns and suggested that related business alliances perform better. The sub-sample analysis 
suggested that unrelated business alliances generate higher cumulative average abnormal 
returns, especially during timeframes around the announcement date [0]. The results obtained 
from the multiple regression analysis were similar, although insignificant, considering the 
phenomenon. Given the entirety of findings, I will reject Hypothesis 5b of a related industry 
premium for business alliances as they were not shown to outperform unrelated alliances. The 
last objective of my paper was to examine whether high-technology business alliances generate 
greater cumulative abnormal returns compared to other types of alliances. Hypothesis 6 
suggested a premium for high-tech firms. My results mostly imply an opposite effect in the 
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Nordic stock market. According to both the sub-sample and the multiple regression analysis, 
the differential effect seems to occur in the proximity of the announcement date [0] where high-
technology business alliances underperform compared to other business alliances. However, 
during the entire 21-day event window [-10, 10] the effect becomes statistically insignificant. 
Given the overall results, I will reject Hypothesis 6 as my evidence suggests that high-tech 
business alliances tend to underperform in the Nordic stock market. 
 
7.1 Limitations and further research 
My results naturally have limitations. The first important limitations are concerned with the 
methodology. The effect of a successful business alliance is measured by the abnormal stock 
market return of a given firm during a specific timeframe. The event study methodology 
associated with this approach has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is the 
ability to capture the immediate stock market effect of the business alliance announcements 
given that the stock market behaves at least semi-effectively. The large sample size is also able 
to adequately suppress the effect of a few extreme observations. However, the event study 
methodology implemented in my study does not capture the long-term benefits and 
disadvantages of forming a business alliance. The decisions to form business alliances are 
usually very strategic in nature and could be difficult for the stock market to correctly value 
without insider information. Therefore, it is possible that the relatively high cumulative average 
abnormal returns in my study arise from investor biases such as noise trading. Some evidence 
of this phenomenon is indicated by the rather large post-event adjustments to the cumulative 
average abnormal returns after the announcement date. Further research could address the 
potential problem and exclusively examine the post-event negative trend and long-term 
performance of firms announcing business alliances. For instance, comparison between the 
performance of similar firms announcing business alliances and those not announcing them, 
could be conducted to answer the long-term success argument. Furthermore, more sophisticated 
regression models could be implemented to explain the cumulative average abnormal returns 
given the circumstances and the scope of the objectives for the research. 
 
Another important limitation arises from my sample size and sub-sampling. The data only 
includes data during the 2000s and only in the Nordic stock market. Furthermore, the data 
consists of only public firms. Therefore, the results might not apply to different markets with 
different characteristics and are not applicable to private firms, for instance. The sample is also 
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divided into different sub-samples often with the primary three-digit SIC codes. Many public 
firms have numerous industries where they operate and simplifying the firm’s industry to only 
one specific primary industry could cause biases in the results. The same problem occurs in the 
sampling of high-technology firms where primary three-digit SIC codes were also used. Further 
research could examine the cumulative average abnormal returns with different criteria for sub-
sampling and in different stock markets with an even larger sample size to draw more definitive 
conclusions. Additional criteria for examining the performance of private firms could also be 
considered and comparisons between different timelines could be examined, for instance, 
before and after the dot-com bubble for high-technology business alliances, and more generally, 
before and after the financial crisis for all business alliances. 
 
7.2 Conclusion 
My paper examined the stock market effect of announcing business alliances in the Nordic 
stock market during 2000-2018 with a sample of 1264 business alliance announcements using 
event study methodology as the core method of analysis. My paper addressed two key 
questions: whether business alliances in the Nordics generally produce positive cumulative 
abnormal returns and which types of business alliances given their characteristics tend to 
outperform other types of alliances. For the first key question regarding general stock market 
performance in the Nordics, my study was able to find consistent proof of positive stock market 
reactions to all business alliance announcements. The finding is robust and consistent with 
many different statistical methods and estimation models. However, I found mixed results for 
the various hypotheses constructed around the second key question regarding important 
differences between business alliance types and their characteristics. My results suggested that 
there is no significant difference in the abnormal returns between joint venture and strategic 
alliance announcements and that most of the differences between business alliance 
characteristics were statistically not very significant. However, there were a few notable 
exceptions: the extremely strong small firm premium and the subpar performances of business 
alliances formed with domestic partners or in the high-technology industry. 
 
Overall, my paper offers a very broad and extensive overview on the stock market reaction to 
announcements of business alliances and on their key characteristics in the Nordic stock market. 
The findings in my study can be used as a reliable reference for further studies approaching 
similar questions and issues regarding interfirm co-operation.  
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Appendix 
 
The Appendix provides the exact results obtained by the event study methodology from the 
three different estimation models used to examine the different hypotheses of my research. The 
models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. 
The equations used to derive the estimation models are found in the methodology section of my 
paper. 
 
Tables 15 and 16 provide the results for all estimation models concerning joint ventures and 
strategic alliances. The results are used to examine Hypothesis 1 which suggests a general 
positive market reaction to business alliances, and Hypothesis 2 which suggests a joint venture 
premium over strategic alliances. 
 
Tables 17, 18, and 19 provide results for all estimation models concerning small cap, mid-cap, 
and large cap firms announcing business alliances. The results are used to examine Hypothesis 
3 which suggests a small firm premium. 
 
Tables 20, 21, 22, and 23 provide results for all estimation models concerning business alliances 
formed with a domestic or a foreign partner and business alliances formed domestically or 
internationally by the alliance’s location. The results are used to examine Hypothesis 4a, which 
suggests a premium for domestic partners, and Hypothesis 4b implying no significant difference 
between domestic and international business alliances measured by the alliance’s location.   
 
Tables 24, 25, 26, and 27 provide results for all estimation models concerning the industry 
relatedness of the partner and of the business alliance. The results are used to examine 
Hypothesis 5a, which suggests no significant difference between related and unrelated partners, 
and Hypothesis 5b, which implies a premium for related business alliances compared to 
unrelated business alliances. 
 
Tables 28 and 29 provide results for all estimation models concerning the technology of the 
business alliance. The results are used to examine Hypothesis 6, which suggests a premium for 
high-technology business alliances. 
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Table 15: Joint venture announcements 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a joint venture. The results are provided by all three estimation models for 
different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], 
the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 424 joint venture announcements in the Nordic stock 
market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 424 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.27% (0.355) 0.30% (0.059) * 0.54% (0.081) * 0.34% (0.015) ** 0.34% (0.259) 0.36% (0.027) **
[-10, -1] 0.40% (0.365) 0.47% (0.228) 0.60% (0.180) 0.45% (0.119) 0.43% (0.340) 0.49% (0.185)
[-5, -1] 0.10% (0.762) -0.20% (0.325) 0.18% (0.600) -0.13% (0.578) 0.09% (0.780) -0.11% (0.378)
[-3, -1] 0.15% (0.611) -0.15% (0.620) 0.05% (0.872) -0.07% (0.604) 0.12% (0.700) -0.11% (0.634)
[-1] 0.14% (0.225) 0.01% (0.455) 0.10% (0.404) 0.02% (0.313) 0.13% (0.269) 0.01% (0.484)
[-10, 10] 1.17% (0.082) * 0.40% (0.291) 1.75% (0.010) ** 0.71% (0.023) ** 1.24% (0.064) * 0.41% (0.221)
[-5, 5] 1.17% (0.025) ** 0.17% (0.235) 1.52% (0.005) *** 0.56% (0.018) ** 1.21% (0.021) ** 0.27% (0.182)
[-3, 3] 1.53% (0.003) *** 0.52% (0.009) *** 1.57% (0.003) *** 0.60% (0.004) *** 1.50% (0.003) *** 0.57% (0.006) ***
[-1, 0] 1.20% (0.000) *** 0.37% (0.000) *** 1.22% (0.001) *** 0.41% (0.000) *** 1.18% (0.001) *** 0.39% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.40% (0.001) *** 0.37% (0.000) *** 1.40% (0.001) *** 0.39% (0.000) *** 1.40% (0.001) *** 0.42% (0.000) ***
[0] 1.06% (0.001) *** 0.20% (0.000) *** 1.11% (0.001) *** 0.23% (0.000) *** 1.05% (0.001) *** 0.21% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.26% (0.002) *** 0.15% (0.005) *** 1.30% (0.001) *** 0.27% (0.004) *** 1.27% (0.002) *** 0.19% (0.004) ***
[1] 0.20% (0.508) -0.03% (0.948) 0.18% (0.338) -0.01% (0.954) 0.21% (0.256) -0.03% (0.974)
[1, 3] 0.32% (0.185) 0.05% (0.707) 0.41% (0.110) 0.16% (0.294) 0.33% (0.160) 0.00% (0.497)
[1, 5] 0.01% (0.977) -0.07% (0.479) 0.23% (0.387) 0.14% (0.791) 0.06% (0.810) 0.03% (0.606)
[1, 10] -0.29% (0.419) -0.28% (0.202) 0.04% (0.906) 0.00% (0.818) -0.24% (0.504) -0.32% (0.293)
[4, 5] -0.31% (0.077) * -0.19% (0.067) * -0.18% (0.338) -0.11% (0.507) -0.27% (0.114) -0.20% (0.082) *
[5, 10] -0.38% (0.193) -0.12% (0.065) * -0.26% (0.397) -0.05% (0.417) -0.36% (0.226) -0.17% (0.080) *
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 16: Strategic alliance announcements 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a strategic alliance. The results are provided by all three estimation models for 
different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], 
the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 840 strategic alliance announcements in the Nordic 
stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 840 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.05% (0.781) -0.07% (0.468) 0.14% (0.504) -0.10% (0.951) 0.07% (0.727) -0.06% (0.545)
[-10, -1] 0.31% (0.243) -0.20% (0.704) 0.42% (0.129) 0.07% (0.913) 0.30% (0.257) -0.11% (0.894)
[-5, -1] 0.22% (0.350) -0.34% (0.223) 0.24% (0.314) -0.34% (0.282) 0.21% (0.373) -0.29% (0.231)
[-3, -1] 0.19% (0.319) -0.13% (0.439) 0.13% (0.504) -0.21% (0.210) 0.17% (0.372) -0.09% (0.425)
[-1] 0.10% (0.440) -0.07% (0.067) * 0.06% (0.641) -0.08% (0.080) * 0.10% (0.423) -0.09% (0.071) *
[-10, 10] 1.11% (0.015) ** -0.06% (0.657) 1.46% (0.001) *** 0.65% (0.048) ** 1.12% (0.014) ** -0.16% (0.603)
[-5, 5] 1.00% (0.006) *** -0.09% (0.359) 1.16% (0.002) *** 0.15% (0.062) * 0.99% (0.007) *** -0.13% (0.370)
[-3, 3] 1.48% (0.000) *** -0.01% (0.019) ** 1.49% (0.000) *** 0.15% (0.006) *** 1.46% (0.000) *** 0.04% (0.014) **
[-1, 0] 1.20% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.000) *** 1.13% (0.000) *** 0.17% (0.001) *** 1.21% (0.000) *** 0.19% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.40% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.001) *** 1.40% (0.000) *** 0.14% (0.001) *** 1.41% (0.000) *** 0.19% (0.000) ***
[0] 1.10% (0.000) *** 0.13% (0.000) *** 1.07% (0.000) *** 0.17% (0.000) *** 1.11% (0.000) *** 0.13% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.30% (0.000) *** 0.14% (0.000) *** 1.34% (0.000) *** 0.21% (0.000) *** 1.31% (0.000) *** 0.18% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.20% (0.105) -0.06% (0.628) 0.27% (0.027) ** -0.03% (0.577) 0.20% (0.099) * -0.07% (0.648)
[1, 3] 0.18% (0.308) -0.24% (0.214) 0.29% (0.110) -0.06% (0.789) 0.18% (0.306) -0.11% (0.301)
[1, 5] -0.32% (0.117) -0.49% (0.001) *** -0.14% (0.486) -0.26% (0.077) * -0.33% (0.108) -0.42% (0.002) ***
[1, 10] -0.30% (0.279) -0.49% (0.005) *** -0.03% (0.912) -0.11% (0.363) -0.29% (0.291) -0.56% (0.007) ***
[4, 5] -0.50% (0.000) *** -0.23% (0.002) *** -0.43% (0.003) *** -0.12% (0.038) ** -0.51% (0.000) *** -0.21% (0.002) ***
[5, 10] -0.31% (0.169) -0.33% (0.007) *** -0.17% (0.453) -0.19% (0.306) -0.28% (0.198) -0.34% (0.013) **
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 17: Business alliance announcements by small cap firms 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of small cap firms announcing a business alliance provided by all the three estimation models for 
different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], 
the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 241 announcements made by small cap firms in the 
Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 241 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.03% (0.964) -0.87% (0.302) 0.27% (0.665) -0.47% (0.772) 0.07% (0.904) -0.64% (0.404)
[-10, -1] 1.80% (0.047) ** -0.01% (0.446) 2.11% (0.021) ** 0.42% (0.216) 1.73% (0.058) * 0.04% (0.398)
[-5, -1] 1.71% (0.030) ** -0.27% (0.619) 1.86% (0.017) ** -0.26% (0.438) 1.63% (0.040) ** -0.13% (0.589)
[-3, -1] 1.69% (0.018) ** 0.01% (0.167) 1.63% (0.023) ** -0.05% (0.178) 1.57% (0.029) ** 0.05% (0.207)
[-1] 0.99% (0.019) ** 0.05% (0.133) 1.00% (0.019) ** 0.07% (0.076) * 0.96% (0.022) ** 0.01% (0.166)
[-10, 10] 5.94% (0.000) *** 1.20% (0.014) ** 6.07% (0.000) *** 1.91% (0.004) *** 5.87% (0.000) *** 0.71% (0.015) **
[-5, 5] 5.44% (0.000) *** 1.64% (0.000) *** 5.68% (0.000) *** 2.35% (0.000) *** 5.38% (0.000) *** 1.71% (0.000) ***
[-3, 3] 6.73% (0.000) *** 2.44% (0.000) *** 6.75% (0.000) *** 2.77% (0.000) *** 6.58% (0.000) *** 2.31% (0.000) ***
[-1, 0] 4.87% (0.000) *** 1.23% (0.000) *** 4.85% (0.000) *** 1.51% (0.000) *** 4.84% (0.000) *** 1.36% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 5.73% (0.000) *** 1.64% (0.000) *** 5.77% (0.000) *** 1.89% (0.000) *** 5.71% (0.000) *** 1.64% (0.000) ***
[0] 3.88% (0.000) *** 0.85% (0.000) *** 3.86% (0.000) *** 0.85% (0.000) *** 3.88% (0.000) *** 0.85% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 4.74% (0.000) *** 0.98% (0.000) *** 4.78% (0.000) *** 1.25% (0.000) *** 4.76% (0.000) *** 1.02% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.86% (0.134) 0.06% (0.199) 0.92% (0.023) ** 0.13% (0.112) 0.88% (0.031) ** 0.01% (0.220)
[1, 3] 1.15% (0.032) ** 0.23% (0.269) 1.27% (0.018) ** 0.26% (0.117) 1.14% (0.033) ** 0.26% (0.264)
[1, 5] -0.16% (0.760) -0.52% (0.145) -0.04% (0.933) -0.11% (0.305) -0.13% (0.798) -0.51% (0.167)
[1, 10] 0.26% (0.734) -0.81% (0.318) 0.10% (0.890) -0.86% (0.382) 0.26% (0.727) -1.06% (0.318)
[4, 5] -1.31% (0.001) *** -0.66% (0.002) *** -1.31% (0.001) *** -0.64% (0.005) *** -1.27% (0.001) *** -0.65% (0.003) ***
[5, 10] -0.50% (0.439) -1.33% (0.004) *** -0.82% (0.208) -1.13% (0.006) *** -0.50% (0.452) -1.14% (0.006) ***
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 18: Business alliance announcements by large cap firms 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of large cap firms announcing a business alliance provided by all the three estimation models for 
different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], 
the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 791 announcements made by large cap firms in the 
Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 791 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.19% (0.194) 0.18% (0.169) 0.25% (0.114) 0.15% (0.096) * 0.22% (0.141) 0.19% (0.091) *
[-10, -1] 0.00% (0.995) -0.03% (0.883) 0.04% (0.860) 0.09% (0.815) 0.04% (0.862) 0.03% (0.843)
[-5, -1] -0.22% (0.160) -0.24% (0.091) * -0.22% (0.191) -0.20% (0.161) -0.20% (0.210) -0.18% (0.118)
[-3, -1] -0.17% (0.178) -0.13% (0.154) -0.22% (0.094) * -0.15% (0.078) * -0.15% (0.223) -0.09% (0.227)
[-1] -0.07% (0.245) -0.05% (0.136) -0.12% (0.079) * -0.02% (0.193) -0.06% (0.292) -0.04% (0.156)
[-10, 10] -0.26% (0.370) -0.40% (0.243) 0.14% (0.665) 0.26% (0.511) -0.22% (0.458) -0.29% (0.343)
[-5, 5] -0.20% (0.364) -0.33% (0.203) -0.03% (0.891) -0.02% (0.889) -0.17% (0.453) -0.28% (0.270)
[-3, 3] 0.03% (0.864) -0.14% (0.927) 0.03% (0.874) -0.07% (0.630) 0.06% (0.755) -0.15% (0.833)
[-1, 0] 0.16% (0.072) * 0.10% (0.085) * 0.10% (0.300) 0.12% (0.210) 0.17% (0.056) * 0.15% (0.046) **
[-1, 1] 0.21% (0.097) * 0.09% (0.126) 0.18% (0.188) 0.10% (0.166) 0.22% (0.074) * 0.13% (0.059) *
[0] 0.23% (0.003) *** 0.08% (0.019) ** 0.22% (0.006) *** 0.06% (0.085) * 0.23% (0.002) *** 0.08% (0.017) **
[0, 1] 0.27% (0.013) ** 0.08% (0.033) ** 0.29% (0.015) ** 0.11% (0.072) * 0.28% (0.011) ** 0.08% (0.020) **
[1] 0.05% (0.533) -0.05% (0.892) 0.08% (0.369) 0.00% (0.633) 0.05% (0.492) -0.04% (0.995)
[1, 3] -0.03% (0.829) -0.20% (0.269) 0.04% (0.770) 0.02% (0.757) -0.02% (0.865) -0.09% (0.419)
[1, 5] -0.21% (0.152) -0.31% (0.009) *** -0.03% (0.854) -0.15% (0.455) -0.20% (0.168) -0.21% (0.016) **
[1, 10] -0.49% (0.022) ** -0.44% (0.003) *** -0.11% (0.624) 0.05% (0.634) -0.49% (0.021) ** -0.49% (0.003) ***
[4, 5] -0.18% (0.030) ** -0.16% (0.017) ** -0.07% (0.458) -0.08% (0.563) -0.18% (0.034) ** -0.16% (0.018) **
[5, 10] -0.34% (0.040) ** -0.10% (0.044) ** -0.10% (0.567) -0.03% (0.954) -0.35% (0.037) ** -0.17% (0.043) **
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 19: Business alliance announcements by mid-cap firms 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of mid-cap firms announcing a business alliance provided by all the three estimation models for 
different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], 
the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 232 announcements made by mid-cap firms in the 
Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 232 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.02% (0.961) 0.25% (0.664) 0.34% (0.374) 0.12% (0.385) 0.04% (0.904) 0.14% (0.733)
[-10, -1] 0.00% (0.998) 0.40% (0.587) 0.30% (0.528) 0.42% (0.446) -0.04% (0.929) 0.41% (0.698)
[-5, -1] -0.07% (0.831) -0.64% (0.385) 0.00% (0.998) -0.56% (0.428) -0.11% (0.735) -0.36% (0.317)
[-3, -1] -0.22% (0.383) -0.38% (0.388) -0.36% (0.187) -0.25% (0.200) -0.28% (0.265) -0.39% (0.268)
[-1] -0.18% (0.243) -0.11% (0.165) -0.23% (0.147) -0.20% (0.129) -0.18% (0.255) -0.15% (0.131)
[-10, 10] 0.91% (0.221) 1.18% (0.142) 1.71% (0.018) ** 0.89% (0.012) ** 0.98% (0.168) 0.85% (0.109)
[-5, 5] 0.80% (0.176) 0.50% (0.135) 1.21% (0.048) ** 0.72% (0.080) * 0.77% (0.188) 0.53% (0.177)
[-3, 3] 1.04% (0.027) ** 0.36% (0.093) * 1.15% (0.019) ** 0.25% (0.108) 1.00% (0.031) ** 0.38% (0.114)
[-1, 0] 0.94% (0.000) *** 0.38% (0.007) *** 0.93% (0.001) *** 0.27% (0.014) ** 0.94% (0.000) *** 0.39% (0.004) ***
[-1, 1] 0.95% (0.016) ** 0.23% (0.064) * 1.04% (0.010) ** 0.18% (0.064) * 0.96% (0.014) ** 0.13% (0.054) *
[0] 1.12% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) *** 1.16% (0.000) *** 0.53% (0.000) *** 1.11% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.13% (0.003) *** 0.18% (0.042) ** 1.27% (0.001) *** 0.30% (0.021) ** 1.14% (0.003) *** 0.14% (0.039) **
[1] 0.01% (0.977) -0.22% (0.047) ** 0.11% (0.653) -0.21% (0.167) 0.02% (0.925) -0.22% (0.072) *
[1, 3] 0.14% (0.688) -0.24% (0.313) 0.35% (0.317) -0.20% (0.823) 0.17% (0.628) -0.17% (0.432)
[1, 5] -0.24% (0.594) -0.32% (0.366) 0.05% (0.916) 0.00% (0.646) -0.23% (0.611) -0.37% (0.432)
[1, 10] -0.21% (0.690) -0.23% (0.683) 0.25% (0.638) 0.25% (0.526) -0.09% (0.867) 0.04% (0.928)
[4, 5] -0.38% (0.236) -0.16% (0.437) -0.30% (0.359) -0.18% (0.545) -0.40% (0.215) -0.07% (0.478)
[5, 10] -0.11% (0.782) 0.01% (0.870) 0.11% (0.788) 0.10% (0.683) 0.01% (0.972) 0.02% (0.854)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test.
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution 
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero.
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Table 20: Business alliance announcements with domestic partners 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance with a domestic partner provided by all the three estimation 
models for different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as 
day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 148 business alliance announcements 
with a domestic partner in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 148 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.02% (0.967) 0.20% (0.697) 0.15% (0.727) -0.16% (0.821) -0.05% (0.898) 0.02% (0.882)
[-10, -1] -0.08% (0.895) -0.13% (0.375) 0.03% (0.960) -0.19% (0.487) -0.22% (0.728) -0.28% (0.327)
[-5, -1] 0.08% (0.884) -0.60% (0.084) * 0.19% (0.726) -0.49% (0.138) 0.04% (0.949) -0.64% (0.064) *
[-3, -1] 0.07% (0.878) -0.44% (0.243) 0.00% (0.996) -0.47% (0.146) 0.01% (0.984) -0.34% (0.170)
[-1] 0.41% (0.139) -0.04% (0.925) 0.40% (0.154) -0.05% (0.961) 0.42% (0.127) 0.00% (0.846)
[-10, 10] -0.44% (0.676) -0.62% (0.515) -0.11% (0.919) -0.70% (0.468) -0.55% (0.604) -0.40% (0.466)
[-5, 5] 0.84% (0.382) -0.01% (0.472) 0.97% (0.321) -0.16% (0.632) 0.83% (0.385) -0.19% (0.464)
[-3, 3] 1.75% (0.067) * 0.24% (0.328) 1.51% (0.119) 0.10% (0.784) 1.76% (0.064) * 0.35% (0.230)
[-1, 0] 1.75% (0.013) ** 0.10% (0.189) 1.76% (0.014) ** 0.06% (0.194) 1.77% (0.012) ** 0.13% (0.105)
[-1, 1] 2.10% (0.017) ** -0.20% (0.371) 2.03% (0.022) ** -0.07% (0.479) 2.11% (0.016) ** -0.21% (0.311)
[0] 1.34% (0.031) ** 0.07% (0.295) 1.36% (0.032) ** -0.05% (0.321) 1.35% (0.031) ** 0.06% (0.277)
[0, 1] 1.69% (0.033) ** 0.08% (0.392) 1.63% (0.043) ** -0.22% (0.610) 1.69% (0.034) ** 0.13% (0.343)
[1] 0.35% (0.642) -0.10% (0.677) 0.27% (0.467) -0.06% (0.594) 0.34% (0.353) -0.07% (0.757)
[1, 3] 0.34% (0.431) 0.13% (0.583) 0.14% (0.751) -0.21% (0.740) 0.40% (0.365) 0.30% (0.347)
[1, 5] -0.59% (0.274) -0.35% (0.131) -0.59% (0.293) -0.32% (0.155) -0.56% (0.300) -0.29% (0.221)
[1, 10] -1.70% (0.009) *** -0.50% (0.122) -1.50% (0.024) ** -0.09% (0.307) -1.69% (0.010) ** 0.04% (0.171)
[4, 5] -0.93% (0.004) *** -0.48% (0.003) *** -0.73% (0.046) ** -0.36% (0.100) * -0.96% (0.004) *** -0.59% (0.004) ***
[5, 10] -1.42% (0.006) *** -0.42% (0.032) ** -1.15% (0.033) ** -0.18% (0.296) -1.42% (0.006) *** -0.58% (0.043) **
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 21: Business alliance announcements with international partners 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance with an international partner provided by all the three 
estimation models for different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement 
day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 1116 business alliance 
announcements with an international partner in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 1116 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.14% (0.419) 0.07% (0.708) 0.29% (0.119) 0.10% (0.159) 0.19% (0.292) 0.11% (0.433)
[-10, -1] 0.40% (0.109) 0.07% (0.436) 0.54% (0.034) ** 0.23% (0.182) 0.42% (0.093) * 0.21% (0.275)
[-5, -1] 0.19% (0.347) -0.25% (0.292) 0.22% (0.285) -0.23% (0.442) 0.19% (0.360) -0.18% (0.349)
[-3, -1] 0.19% (0.268) -0.13% (0.590) 0.12% (0.508) -0.14% (0.365) 0.17% (0.325) -0.09% (0.630)
[-1] 0.07% (0.453) -0.05% (0.217) 0.03% (0.749) -0.03% (0.328) 0.07% (0.476) -0.05% (0.198)
[-10, 10] 1.34% (0.001) *** 0.15% (0.201) 1.78% (0.000) *** 0.78% (0.001) *** 1.39% (0.001) *** 0.06% (0.140)
[-5, 5] 1.09% (0.001) *** 0.00% (0.077) * 1.32% (0.000) *** 0.53% (0.001) *** 1.09% (0.001) *** 0.00% (0.067) *
[-3, 3] 1.46% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.001) *** 1.52% (0.000) *** 0.35% (0.000) *** 1.44% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.001) ***
[-1, 0] 1.13% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.000) *** 1.08% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 1.12% (0.000) *** 0.28% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.30% (0.000) *** 0.28% (0.000) *** 1.32% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.000) *** 1.31% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.000) ***
[0] 1.05% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.000) *** 1.05% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) *** 1.05% (0.000) *** 0.17% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.23% (0.000) *** 0.17% (0.000) *** 1.29% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.000) *** 1.24% (0.000) *** 0.19% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.18% (0.094) * -0.05% (0.749) 0.24% (0.026) ** -0.01% (0.523) 0.19% (0.076) * -0.05% (0.820)
[1, 3] 0.21% (0.162) -0.17% (0.294) 0.36% (0.024) ** -0.02% (0.314) 0.21% (0.162) -0.10% (0.400)
[1, 5] -0.16% (0.340) -0.34% (0.006) *** 0.06% (0.734) -0.10% (0.368) -0.15% (0.372) -0.29% (0.009) ***
[1, 10] -0.11% (0.641) -0.44% (0.007) *** 0.19% (0.416) -0.04% (0.771) -0.08% (0.718) -0.52% (0.011) **
[4, 5] -0.37% (0.002) *** -0.16% (0.005) *** -0.30% (0.013) ** -0.11% (0.113) -0.36% (0.002) *** -0.18% (0.007) ***
[5, 10] -0.19% (0.321) -0.19% (0.007) *** -0.07% (0.700) -0.10% (0.302) -0.16% (0.387) -0.26% (0.013) **
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 22: Domestic business alliance announcements by the alliance’s location 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance where either the firm or its partner, or both, are located in 
the same country as the business alliance provided by all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, 
and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –
11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 672 domestic business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 672 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.31% (0.164) 0.19% (0.181) 0.47% (0.042) ** 0.12% (0.085) * 0.36% (0.107) 0.19% (0.128)
[-10, -1] 0.84% (0.014) ** 0.17% (0.399) 1.02% (0.003) *** 0.19% (0.161) 0.86% (0.012) ** 0.22% (0.245)
[-5, -1] 0.59% (0.045) ** -0.21% (0.302) 0.70% (0.020) ** -0.17% (0.691) 0.60% (0.044) ** -0.16% (0.373)
[-3, -1] 0.49% (0.059) * -0.15% (0.321) 0.43% (0.101) -0.14% (0.343) 0.47% (0.069) * -0.11% (0.331)
[-1] 0.25% (0.107) -0.03% (0.620) 0.19% (0.233) -0.02% (0.714) 0.25% (0.106) -0.03% (0.646)
[-10, 10] 1.50% (0.010) *** 0.09% (0.282) 1.98% (0.001) *** 0.69% (0.020) ** 1.55% (0.007) *** 0.02% (0.251)
[-5, 5] 1.47% (0.002) *** -0.11% (0.336) 1.68% (0.001) *** 0.09% (0.063) * 1.49% (0.002) *** -0.03% (0.287)
[-3, 3] 1.96% (0.000) *** 0.32% (0.008) *** 1.94% (0.000) *** 0.32% (0.004) *** 1.96% (0.000) *** 0.33% (0.004) ***
[-1, 0] 1.36% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) *** 1.30% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) *** 1.35% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.68% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.000) *** 1.62% (0.000) *** 0.20% (0.001) *** 1.67% (0.000) *** 0.25% (0.000) ***
[0] 1.11% (0.000) *** 0.11% (0.000) *** 1.11% (0.000) *** 0.15% (0.000) *** 1.11% (0.000) *** 0.12% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.43% (0.000) *** 0.15% (0.000) *** 1.43% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.000) *** 1.42% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.31% (0.145) 0.02% (0.455) 0.32% (0.042) ** 0.03% (0.370) 0.32% (0.046) ** -0.01% (0.459)
[1, 3] 0.36% (0.080) * 0.02% (0.636) 0.40% (0.060) * 0.16% (0.237) 0.38% (0.062) * 0.07% (0.373)
[1, 5] -0.24% (0.287) -0.27% (0.041) ** -0.14% (0.564) -0.10% (0.332) -0.21% (0.354) -0.17% (0.078) *
[1, 10] -0.46% (0.143) -0.43% (0.029) ** -0.15% (0.643) 0.05% (0.666) -0.42% (0.181) -0.43% (0.044) **
[4, 5] -0.60% (0.000) *** -0.29% (0.000) *** -0.53% (0.002) *** -0.24% (0.011) ** -0.59% (0.000) *** -0.31% (0.001) ***
[5, 10] -0.50% (0.052) * -0.29% (0.006) *** -0.26% (0.325) -0.05% (0.394) -0.48% (0.063) * -0.40% (0.007) ***
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 23: International business alliance announcements by the alliance’s location 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance where the firm, its partner, and the business alliance are all 
located in a different country provided by all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson 
beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. 
The sample consists of 592 international business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 592 Median Median
[-10, -5] -0.08% (0.743) -0.17% (0.455) 0.05% (0.856) -0.01% (0.879) -0.07% (0.771) -0.04% (0.588)
[-10, -1] -0.22% (0.462) -0.17% (0.765) -0.13% (0.688) 0.11% (0.964) -0.24% (0.424) -0.07% (0.791)
[-5, -1] -0.29% (0.194) -0.37% (0.223) -0.33% (0.153) -0.39% (0.173) -0.32% (0.164) -0.31% (0.187)
[-3, -1] -0.17% (0.366) -0.13% (0.782) -0.27% (0.176) -0.18% (0.343) -0.21% (0.275) -0.08% (0.726)
[-1] -0.04% (0.704) -0.06% (0.264) -0.05% (0.626) -0.05% (0.343) -0.04% (0.671) -0.06% (0.225)
[-10, 10] 0.72% (0.127) 0.12% (0.770) 1.08% (0.022) ** 0.67% (0.067) * 0.72% (0.128) -0.03% (0.645)
[-5, 5] 0.59% (0.080) * 0.07% (0.292) 0.84% (0.014) ** 0.60% (0.025) ** 0.57% (0.090) * 0.01% (0.288)
[-3, 3] 0.97% (0.001) *** 0.05% (0.025) ** 1.04% (0.001) *** 0.27% (0.008) *** 0.93% (0.002) *** 0.11% (0.028) **
[-1, 0] 1.02% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) *** 1.00% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.001) *** 1.02% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.08% (0.000) *** 0.21% (0.002) *** 1.16% (0.000) *** 0.31% (0.000) *** 1.10% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.001) ***
[0] 1.05% (0.000) *** 0.18% (0.000) *** 1.05% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.000) *** 1.07% (0.000) *** 0.18% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.12% (0.000) *** 0.14% (0.001) *** 1.21% (0.000) *** 0.25% (0.000) *** 1.15% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.06% (0.610) -0.12% (0.143) 0.15% (0.240) -0.08% (0.736) 0.08% (0.522) -0.09% (0.195)
[1, 3] 0.08% (0.683) -0.33% (0.087) * 0.26% (0.215) -0.11% (0.949) 0.07% (0.730) -0.31% (0.092) *
[1, 5] -0.17% (0.441) -0.39% (0.018) ** 0.12% (0.609) -0.14% (0.362) -0.18% (0.417) -0.34% (0.019) **
[1, 10] -0.11% (0.725) -0.48% (0.036) ** 0.16% (0.613) -0.16% (0.670) -0.10% (0.726) -0.56% (0.047) **
[4, 5] -0.25% (0.078) * -0.12% (0.111) -0.14% (0.337) -0.06% (0.797) -0.25% (0.084) * -0.12% (0.122)
[5, 10] -0.14% (0.566) -0.17% (0.067) * -0.13% (0.594) -0.24% (0.313) -0.12% (0.627) -0.23% (0.133)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test.
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution 
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero.
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Table 24: Business alliances announced by related partners 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance with a related partner where the firm and the partner share 
the same primary three-digit SIC code provided by all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, and 
the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-
260, -11]. The sample consists of 391 business alliance announcements made by related partners in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 391 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.25% (0.382) 0.23% (0.526) 0.43% (0.144) 0.40% (0.172) 0.35% (0.218) 0.44% (0.286)
[-10, -1] 0.09% (0.831) 0.09% (0.856) 0.29% (0.504) 0.12% (0.956) 0.11% (0.798) 0.21% (0.982)
[-5, -1] -0.09% (0.813) -0.27% (0.248) -0.03% (0.930) -0.33% (0.208) -0.13% (0.728) -0.36% (0.229)
[-3, -1] -0.15% (0.626) -0.30% (0.146) -0.26% (0.413) -0.36% (0.052) * -0.23% (0.474) -0.25% (0.125)
[-1] -0.08% (0.603) -0.04% (0.275) -0.15% (0.333) -0.08% (0.105) -0.09% (0.565) -0.04% (0.308)
[-10, 10] 1.57% (0.041) ** 0.17% (0.414) 2.10% (0.005) *** 0.77% (0.039) ** 1.64% (0.030) ** 0.04% (0.366)
[-5, 5] 1.38% (0.019) ** 0.09% (0.183) 1.57% (0.008) *** 0.09% (0.079) * 1.34% (0.022) ** 0.09% (0.225)
[-3, 3] 1.84% (0.000) *** 0.21% (0.029) ** 1.74% (0.001) *** 0.08% (0.047) ** 1.75% (0.001) *** 0.33% (0.038) **
[-1, 0] 1.58% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.001) *** 1.47% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.004) *** 1.60% (0.000) *** 0.39% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.71% (0.000) *** 0.21% (0.005) *** 1.64% (0.000) *** 0.11% (0.010) *** 1.74% (0.000) *** 0.30% (0.001) ***
[0] 1.66% (0.000) *** 0.25% (0.000) *** 1.62% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.000) *** 1.68% (0.000) *** 0.31% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.79% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.001) *** 1.79% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.003) *** 1.82% (0.000) *** 0.31% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.12% (0.704) -0.11% (0.507) 0.17% (0.412) -0.06% (0.761) 0.14% (0.496) -0.11% (0.594)
[1, 3] 0.33% (0.246) -0.32% (0.295) 0.39% (0.182) -0.29% (0.483) 0.29% (0.303) -0.27% (0.335)
[1, 5] -0.19% (0.532) -0.47% (0.052) * -0.01% (0.969) -0.45% (0.127) -0.21% (0.503) -0.45% (0.055) *
[1, 10] -0.19% (0.667) -0.43% (0.213) 0.19% (0.660) 0.01% (0.964) -0.15% (0.724) -0.40% (0.269)
[4, 5] -0.52% (0.034) ** -0.19% (0.079) * -0.40% (0.104) -0.11% (0.326) -0.50% (0.039) ** -0.18% (0.101)
[5, 10] -0.34% (0.335) -0.15% (0.103) -0.10% (0.781) 0.10% (0.910) -0.27% (0.450) -0.25% (0.171)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
Post-event
Event
Pre-event
p
a
p
b
p
b
Mean p
a
p
b
Mean
Event 
window Mean p
a
Median
Market model CAAR Market-adjusted model CAAR Dimson beta model CAAR
83 
 
 
 
Table 25: Business alliances announced by unrelated partners 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance with an unrelated partner where the firm and the partner do 
not share the same primary three-digit SIC code provided by all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted 
model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on 
day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 873 business alliance announcements made by unrelated partners in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 873 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.07% (0.713) 0.02% (0.879) 0.20% (0.336) -0.10% (0.490) 0.07% (0.719) -0.03% (0.897)
[-10, -1] 0.45% (0.094) * -0.03% (0.554) 0.56% (0.045) ** 0.18% (0.247) 0.45% (0.100) * 0.01% (0.455)
[-5, -1] 0.30% (0.181) -0.27% (0.246) 0.33% (0.146) -0.23% (0.547) 0.30% (0.172) -0.19% (0.299)
[-3, -1] 0.33% (0.088) * -0.08% (0.947) 0.27% (0.170) -0.08% (0.778) 0.32% (0.090) * -0.04% (0.954)
[-1] 0.20% (0.089) * -0.05% (0.547) 0.18% (0.147) -0.01% (0.985) 0.20% (0.086) * -0.04% (0.496)
[-10, 10] 0.94% (0.028) ** 0.06% (0.556) 1.31% (0.002) *** 0.50% (0.035) ** 0.95% (0.027) ** 0.00% (0.470)
[-5, 5] 0.91% (0.008) *** -0.09% (0.420) 1.15% (0.001) *** 0.55% (0.020) ** 0.93% (0.007) *** -0.09% (0.319)
[-3, 3] 1.34% (0.000) *** 0.19% (0.006) *** 1.42% (0.000) *** 0.36% (0.001) *** 1.35% (0.000) *** 0.20% (0.003) ***
[-1, 0] 1.03% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.000) *** 1.02% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.000) *** 1.02% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.26% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.000) *** 1.30% (0.000) *** 0.27% (0.000) *** 1.26% (0.000) *** 0.21% (0.000) ***
[0] 0.83% (0.000) *** 0.13% (0.000) *** 0.84% (0.000) *** 0.15% (0.000) *** 0.82% (0.000) *** 0.13% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.06% (0.000) *** 0.11% (0.000) *** 1.12% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 1.06% (0.000) *** 0.15% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.23% (0.046) ** -0.03% (0.974) 0.28% (0.020) ** 0.00% (0.447) 0.23% (0.043) ** -0.03% (0.989)
[1, 3] 0.18% (0.268) -0.05% (0.850) 0.30% (0.074) * 0.17% (0.128) 0.21% (0.206) -0.03% (0.892)
[1, 5] -0.21% (0.242) -0.24% (0.018) ** -0.02% (0.916) 0.01% (0.551) -0.19% (0.299) -0.18% (0.033) **
[1, 10] -0.34% (0.170) -0.47% (0.005) *** -0.09% (0.714) -0.10% (0.475) -0.32% (0.192) -0.54% (0.008) ***
[4, 5] -0.39% (0.001) *** -0.23% (0.001) *** -0.32% (0.009) *** -0.12% (0.065) * -0.40% (0.001) *** -0.22% (0.001) ***
[5, 10] -0.33% (0.106) -0.27% (0.004) *** -0.25% (0.243) -0.20% (0.141) -0.33% (0.103) -0.34% (0.005) ***
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 26: Related business alliance announcements 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance where the firm or its partner share a primary three-digit SIC 
code with the announced business alliance, provided by all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted model, 
and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –
11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 550 related business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 550 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.55% (0.014) ** 0.28% (0.026) ** 0.70% (0.002) *** 0.27% (0.008) *** 0.59% (0.008) *** 0.27% (0.015) **
[-10, -1] 0.50% (0.129) 0.24% (0.301) 0.58% (0.073) * 0.34% (0.159) 0.51% (0.121) 0.42% (0.219)
[-5, -1] -0.19% (0.472) -0.42% (0.079) * -0.18% (0.507) -0.42% (0.101) -0.20% (0.439) -0.39% (0.069) *
[-3, -1] -0.03% (0.901) -0.17% (0.141) -0.11% (0.621) -0.26% (0.045) ** -0.05% (0.816) -0.15% (0.112)
[-1] 0.02% (0.863) -0.11% (0.180) 0.02% (0.882) -0.04% (0.459) 0.02% (0.847) -0.14% (0.177)
[-10, 10] 1.14% (0.033) ** -0.15% (0.924) 1.50% (0.005) *** 0.25% (0.162) 1.16% (0.030) ** -0.13% (0.845)
[-5, 5] 0.61% (0.128) -0.16% (0.775) 0.77% (0.055) * -0.01% (0.568) 0.62% (0.124) -0.23% (0.709)
[-3, 3] 0.93% (0.011) ** -0.12% (0.680) 0.88% (0.017) ** -0.19% (0.426) 0.93% (0.010) ** -0.24% (0.672)
[-1, 0] 0.76% (0.001) *** 0.09% (0.079) * 0.76% (0.002) *** 0.17% (0.036) ** 0.76% (0.001) *** 0.08% (0.092) *
[-1, 1] 0.95% (0.001) *** 0.08% (0.099) * 1.01% (0.000) *** 0.16% (0.037) ** 0.96% (0.000) *** 0.09% (0.067) *
[0] 0.74% (0.001) *** 0.08% (0.023) ** 0.74% (0.001) *** 0.11% (0.015) ** 0.74% (0.001) *** 0.07% (0.028) **
[0, 1] 0.93% (0.000) *** 0.03% (0.105) 0.99% (0.000) *** 0.12% (0.029) ** 0.94% (0.000) *** 0.05% (0.065) *
[1] 0.19% (0.400) -0.06% (0.569) 0.25% (0.074) * -0.01% (0.635) 0.20% (0.132) -0.05% (0.721)
[1, 3] 0.21% (0.290) -0.06% (0.593) 0.25% (0.236) -0.02% (0.723) 0.24% (0.241) -0.04% (0.828)
[1, 5] 0.06% (0.792) -0.19% (0.135) 0.21% (0.343) 0.02% (0.719) 0.08% (0.706) -0.10% (0.192)
[1, 10] -0.10% (0.753) -0.44% (0.050) * 0.17% (0.585) 0.02% (0.744) -0.09% (0.779) -0.48% (0.066) *
[4, 5] -0.16% (0.264) -0.19% (0.088) * -0.04% (0.780) -0.09% (0.716) -0.16% (0.275) -0.18% (0.103)
[5, 10] -0.35% (0.147) -0.33% (0.001) *** -0.17% (0.490) -0.18% (0.118) -0.37% (0.136) -0.34% (0.002) ***
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 27: Unrelated business alliance announcements 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a business alliance where the firm and its partner do not share a primary three-
digit SIC code with the announced business alliance, provided by all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are the market model, market-adjusted 
model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates begins on day -260 and ends on 
day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 714 unrelated business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 714 Median Median
[-10, -5] -0.20% (0.397) -0.14% (0.202) -0.06% (0.815) -0.11% (0.594) -0.17% (0.460) -0.16% (0.284)
[-10, -1] 0.22% (0.489) -0.15% (0.720) 0.40% (0.235) 0.05% (0.926) 0.22% (0.500) -0.07% (0.848)
[-5, -1] 0.46% (0.089) * -0.21% (0.574) 0.52% (0.058) * -0.14% (0.856) 0.45% (0.092) * -0.14% (0.672)
[-3, -1] 0.34% (0.157) -0.08% (0.950) 0.27% (0.271) -0.04% (0.953) 0.31% (0.195) -0.02% (0.892)
[-1] 0.19% (0.176) -0.03% (0.778) 0.12% (0.397) -0.03% (0.573) 0.18% (0.189) -0.01% (0.729)
[-10, 10] 1.13% (0.033) ** 0.29% (0.236) 1.61% (0.003) *** 0.90% (0.008) *** 1.16% (0.027) ** 0.09% (0.188)
[-5, 5] 1.40% (0.001) *** 0.10% (0.037) ** 1.68% (0.000) *** 0.70% (0.001) *** 1.40% (0.001) *** 0.20% (0.023) **
[-3, 3] 1.93% (0.000) *** 0.40% (0.000) *** 2.01% (0.000) *** 0.67% (0.000) *** 1.90% (0.000) *** 0.55% (0.000) ***
[-1, 0] 1.54% (0.000) *** 0.36% (0.000) *** 1.47% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.000) *** 1.54% (0.000) *** 0.38% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.74% (0.000) *** 0.38% (0.000) *** 1.71% (0.000) *** 0.34% (0.000) *** 1.75% (0.000) *** 0.37% (0.000) ***
[0] 1.35% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) *** 1.35% (0.000) *** 0.23% (0.000) *** 1.36% (0.000) *** 0.25% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.56% (0.000) *** 0.29% (0.000) *** 1.59% (0.000) *** 0.32% (0.000) *** 1.57% (0.000) *** 0.28% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.20% (0.173) -0.06% (0.915) 0.24% (0.109) -0.02% (0.890) 0.21% (0.163) -0.05% (0.879)
[1, 3] 0.24% (0.236) -0.14% (0.558) 0.39% (0.057) * -0.06% (0.422) 0.23% (0.249) -0.09% (0.670)
[1, 5] -0.41% (0.071) * -0.43% (0.006) *** -0.19% (0.414) -0.26% (0.137) -0.41% (0.073) * -0.49% (0.008) ***
[1, 10] -0.45% (0.144) -0.43% (0.020) ** -0.14% (0.653) -0.11% (0.600) -0.41% (0.171) -0.47% (0.032) **
[4, 5] -0.65% (0.000) *** -0.24% (0.001) *** -0.59% (0.001) *** -0.13% (0.016) ** -0.64% (0.000) *** -0.23% (0.001) ***
[5, 10] -0.31% (0.212) -0.15% (0.105) -0.22% (0.392) -0.07% (0.665) -0.27% (0.287) -0.25% (0.172)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 28: High-technology business alliances 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a high-technology business alliance where the alliance’s three-digit SIC code 
matches with the high-technology criteria provided by Kile and Philips (2009) provided by all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are the 
market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model estimates 
begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 511 high-technology business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market during 2000-
2018. 
 
N = 511 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.29% (0.257) 0.19% (0.253) 0.54% (0.042) ** 0.36% (0.026) ** 0.30% (0.232) 0.18% (0.199)
[-10, -1] 0.18% (0.603) -0.01% (0.651) 0.38% (0.274) 0.41% (0.195) 0.21% (0.539) 0.06% (0.444)
[-5, -1] -0.12% (0.658) -0.38% (0.093) * -0.08% (0.762) -0.51% (0.142) -0.09% (0.740) -0.40% (0.109)
[-3, -1] -0.13% (0.550) -0.23% (0.210) -0.23% (0.302) -0.35% (0.067) * -0.12% (0.593) -0.19% (0.249)
[-1] -0.04% (0.732) -0.11% (0.117) -0.05% (0.660) -0.04% (0.396) -0.02% (0.861) -0.10% (0.190)
[-10, 10] 0.33% (0.564) -0.41% (0.557) 0.99% (0.083) * 0.26% (0.286) 0.38% (0.498) -0.38% (0.714)
[-5, 5] 0.37% (0.369) -0.23% (0.676) 0.70% (0.097) * -0.15% (0.661) 0.41% (0.328) -0.31% (0.687)
[-3, 3] 0.75% (0.045) ** -0.45% (0.812) 0.78% (0.042) ** -0.06% (0.482) 0.79% (0.036) ** -0.34% (0.693)
[-1, 0] 0.78% (0.002) *** 0.08% (0.176) 0.78% (0.003) *** 0.10% (0.110) 0.82% (0.001) *** 0.14% (0.062) *
[-1, 1] 0.79% (0.004) *** -0.01% (0.298) 0.86% (0.002) *** 0.09% (0.120) 0.85% (0.002) *** 0.05% (0.109)
[0] 0.82% (0.001) *** 0.09% (0.014) ** 0.83% (0.000) *** 0.12% (0.013) ** 0.84% (0.000) *** 0.10% (0.006) ***
[0, 1] 0.83% (0.001) *** 0.05% (0.043) ** 0.91% (0.000) *** 0.12% (0.010) *** 0.87% (0.001) *** 0.11% (0.019) **
[1] 0.02% (0.946) -0.09% (0.361) 0.08% (0.506) -0.03% (0.798) 0.03% (0.778) -0.09% (0.463)
[1, 3] 0.07% (0.752) -0.24% (0.376) 0.18% (0.401) -0.02% (0.684) 0.06% (0.766) -0.10% (0.432)
[1, 5] -0.33% (0.169) -0.46% (0.009) *** -0.05% (0.832) -0.17% (0.262) -0.35% (0.148) -0.35% (0.013) **
[1, 10] -0.67% (0.053) * -0.54% (0.007) *** -0.23% (0.516) -0.09% (0.409) -0.66% (0.052) * -0.61% (0.007) ***
[4, 5] -0.39% (0.029) ** -0.24% (0.019) ** -0.23% (0.215) -0.12% (0.358) -0.41% (0.025) ** -0.25% (0.018) **
[5, 10] -0.59% (0.032) ** -0.45% (0.000) *** -0.36% (0.192) -0.47% (0.068) * -0.56% (0.039) ** -0.51% (0.001) ***
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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Table 29: Non-high-technology business alliances 
The below table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of firms announcing a non-high-technology business alliance where the alliance’s three-digit SIC 
code does not match with the high-tech criteria provided by Kile and Philips (2009) provided by all the three estimation models for different event windows. The models are 
the market model, market-adjusted model, and the Dimson beta model, respectively. Defining the announcement day as day zero [0], the estimation period for the model 
estimates begins on day -260 and ends on day –11 [-260, -11]. The sample consists of 753 non-high-technology business alliance announcements in the Nordic stock market 
during 2000-2018. 
 
N = 753 Median Median
[-10, -5] 0.02% (0.919) 0.01% (0.759) 0.09% (0.694) -0.06% (0.922) 0.06% (0.776) 0.04% (0.968)
[-10, -1] 0.46% (0.148) 0.04% (0.887) 0.55% (0.087) * -0.07% (0.764) 0.44% (0.165) 0.09% (0.815)
[-5, -1] 0.38% (0.148) -0.21% (0.503) 0.42% (0.111) -0.14% (0.717) 0.34% (0.195) -0.12% (0.511)
[-3, -1] 0.39% (0.092) * -0.07% (0.895) 0.34% (0.154) -0.06% (0.827) 0.34% (0.148) -0.06% (0.789)
[-1] 0.22% (0.103) -0.03% (0.879) 0.16% (0.235) -0.03% (0.622) 0.20% (0.134) -0.03% (0.681)
[-10, 10] 1.68% (0.001) *** 0.47% (0.090) * 1.94% (0.000) *** 0.90% (0.004) *** 1.69% (0.001) *** 0.35% (0.079) *
[-5, 5] 1.52% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.028) ** 1.68% (0.000) *** 0.71% (0.001) *** 1.50% (0.000) *** 0.36% (0.024) **
[-3, 3] 1.99% (0.000) *** 0.49% (0.000) *** 2.02% (0.000) *** 0.59% (0.000) *** 1.94% (0.000) *** 0.58% (0.000) ***
[-1, 0] 1.49% (0.000) *** 0.37% (0.000) *** 1.41% (0.000) *** 0.32% (0.000) *** 1.46% (0.000) *** 0.37% (0.000) ***
[-1, 1] 1.81% (0.000) *** 0.39% (0.000) *** 1.77% (0.000) *** 0.40% (0.000) *** 1.78% (0.000) *** 0.41% (0.000) ***
[0] 1.27% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 1.25% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 1.26% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) ***
[0, 1] 1.59% (0.000) *** 0.24% (0.000) *** 1.61% (0.000) *** 0.26% (0.000) *** 1.58% (0.000) *** 0.22% (0.000) ***
[1] 0.32% (0.038) ** -0.03% (0.866) 0.36% (0.023) ** -0.02% (0.442) 0.32% (0.037) ** -0.04% (0.887)
[1, 3] 0.34% (0.085) * -0.09% (0.747) 0.43% (0.032) ** -0.07% (0.459) 0.35% (0.073) * -0.06% (0.990)
[1, 5] -0.13% (0.549) -0.29% (0.070) * 0.01% (0.981) -0.09% (0.431) -0.09% (0.658) -0.18% (0.099) *
[1, 10] -0.04% (0.882) -0.32% (0.092) * 0.14% (0.617) -0.06% (0.895) 0.00% (0.990) -0.36% (0.151)
[4, 5] -0.46% (0.001) *** -0.19% (0.005) *** -0.43% (0.003) *** -0.11% (0.055) * -0.44% (0.001) *** -0.20% (0.008) ***
[5, 10] -0.16% (0.496) -0.10% (0.166) -0.09% (0.703) 0.01% (0.877) -0.14% (0.544) -0.15% (0.200)
a
 Numbers in parantheses represent p-values for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero using the traditional two-tailed t-test. * p < .10
b
 The statistical significance for the median is obtained with Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for a single sample using the normal distribution ** p < .05
   approximation. Numbers in parantheses represent the p-values for the null hypothesis that the median is zero. *** p < .01
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